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Overcoming Under-Compensation
and Under-Deterrence in
Intentional Tort Cases: Are
Statutory Multiple Damages the
Best Remedy?
by Stephen J. Shapiro·
I.

INTRODUCTION

There is a general agreement that the primary purpose of tort law is
to compensate parties injured by the wrongful conduct of another.l
Typically, a prevailing plaintiff is awarded compensatory damages. 2

* Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law. Haverford College (B.A.,
1971); University of Pennsylvania Law School (J.D., 1976). Member, State Bar of
Maryland.
1. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 (1979). The Restatement (Second) of
Torts states that "the purpose II for which actions of tort are maintainable ... are: (a) to
give compensation, indemnity[,] or restitution for harms." Id.; see also United States ex reI.
Jones v. Rundle, 453 F.2d 147, 150 n.11 (3d Cir. 1971) (explaining that "[tjhe underlying
philosophy of tort law ... is that the plaintiff should be compensated for the harm he has
suffered"); Seattle First Nat'l Bank v. Shoreline Concrete Co., 588 P.2d 1308, 1312 (Wash.
1978) (stating that "[tlhe cornerstone of tort law is the assurance of full compensation to
the injured party"); Walter H. Beckham, Jr. et aI., Towards a Jurisprudence of Injury: The
Continuing Creation of a System of Substantive Justice in American Tort Law, 1984 A.B.A.
SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE TORT LIABILITY SYSTEM 4-29 (naming compensation as "one
of the main announced goals of tort law"); E. ALAN FARNSWORTH, .AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE UNITED STATES 113 (1983) (explaining that "[tlhe essential
purpose of the law of torts is compensatory"); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 4, at 20 (5th ed. 1984) (stating that "raj recognized need
for compensation is ... a powerful factor influencing tort law").
2. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, at 113. Compensatory damages, also referred to as
actual damages, see BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 445 (9th ed. 2009), are the most common
form of damages in the tort-law system. Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Disaggregating More-
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The main purpose of tort law is to make the plaintiff whole, to the
extent possible, in order to put the plaintiff in the same financial
situation the plaintiff would have been in absent the defendant's
actions. 3 A prevailing plaintiff, however, will not normally be made
whole by the award of a reasonable amount of compensatory damages. 4
The primary reason for this insufficiency is that the plaintiff will have
to pay her attorney out of the money received in the award. 5
A secondary purpose of tort law is to deter wrongful, potentially
harmful conduct. s This purpose is especially pertinent to intentional
conduct. 7 A party will be less willing to engage in intentional tortious
conduct if he knows he will have to pay for the harm; therefore, to the
extent that a defendant can engage in tortious conduct and not be held
fully accountable financially, the maximum deterrent effect of the law
is not being realized.
Just as compensatory damages might not be adequate to compensate
plaintiffs completely, they may also be insufficient to adequately deter
intentional tortious conduct. Since not all injured parties can, or will,

Than· Whole Damages in Personal Injury Law: Deterrence and Punishment, 71 TENN. L.
REV. 117, 119 (2003). These damages are awarded to restore the plaintiff to his or her
position prior to commission of the tortious act and may include damages for pain and
suffering, emotional distress, permanent injury, loss of enjoyment oflife, medical expenses,
lost wages, and impairment of earning capacity. Id.
3. Galligan, supra note 2, at 119. "The cornerstone of tort law is the assurance of full
compensation to the injured party." Seattle First Nat'l Bank, 588 P.2d at 1312; see also
Francisco v. United States, 267 F.3d 303, 316 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v.
Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 235 (1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (stating that "one of
the hallmarks of traditional tort liability is the availability of a broad range of damages to
compensate the plaintiff fairly for injuries caused by the violation of his legal rights").
Courts have long recognized that in some instances, a plaintiff cannot be made whole in
the absence of an interest award. See Gen. Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648,65456 (1983); Waite v. United States, 282 U.S. 508, 508-09 (1931); Miller v. Robertson, 266
U.S. 243,257-59 (1924).
4. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 914 & cmt. a.
5. See id. Other reasons why compensatory damages do not make a plaintiff whole
include the lack of pre-judgment interest to compensate for delay in payment and other
collateral expenses of litigation. See infra text accompanying note 38.
6. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 19 (2000) ("Courts and writers almost always
recognize that another aim of tort law is to deter certain kinds of conduct by imposing
liability when that conduct causes harm.") Af; to deterring negligent conduct, see Travelers
Indem. Co. v. PCR, Inc., 889 So. 2d 779, 795 (Fla. 2004) (stating that "an equally basic aim
of imposing liability for compensatory damages resulting from negligent conduct is to deter
such conduct"); see also Villaman v. Schee, Nos. 92-15490, 92-15562, 1994 WL 6661, at *4
(9th Cir. Jan. 10, 1994) (stating that "Arizona tort law is designed in part to deter
negligent conduct within its borders").
7. For a discussion of how tort damages are more effective at deterring intentional
conduct, as opposed to negligent conduct, see infra text accompanying notes 52-54.
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successfully bring suit, the maximum amount of compensatory damages
faced by a defendant will often be significantly less than the damage the
defendant has caused and, in some cases, less than the benefits the
defendant has reaped. In those cases when tortfeasors hope to gain
more than they expect to pay in damages, the deterrent effect may fail. 8
Several mechanisms exist in American law to help alleviate the problem:
punitive damages, awards of attorney fees, and multiple-double or
treble-damages.
Punitive damages were developed under the common law to punish
and deter particularly egregious tortious conduct. 9 For this reason,
punitive damages have very little effect-either compensatory or
deterrent-on intentional behavior that does not rise to this very high
level of wrongfulness. Even in regard to the truly despicable conduct
that punitive damages were designed to deter, a high level of proof, wide
jury discretion, and other factors have led to sporadic success and have
made these damages less than effective. lO In addition, the occasional
imposition of excessively high awards has led the Supreme Court of the
United States and some state legislatures to significantly cut back on
the availability of such awards. 11
Awarding attorney fees to the prevailing party is another possibility
for addressing the situation. Awarding fees to both prevailing plaintiffs
and prevailing defendants under similar standards, however, would have
the negative effect of discouraging plaintiffs from bringing meritorious
claims for fear of financial ruin if they were to lose.1 2 There are a large
number of federal and some state statutes that award attorney fees
routinely to prevailing plaintiffs but to defendants only if the plaintiff's
case was frivolous. 13 These statutes have proven to be a very effective
way to facilitate the bringing of private lawsuits to help further public
goals, such as combating discrimination and consumer fraud. 14
When public goals are not implicated, however, such one-way attorneyfees statutes generally have not been used to help compensate plaintiffs. 15 It might also be inappropriate to extend these statutes to a
broad range of intentional torts. In addition, one-way attorney-fees

8. See id.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 64-65.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 101-03.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 78-92.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 125-27.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 133-46.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 147-49.
15. See id.
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statutes generate considerable extra litigation over the fees themselves. 16
Statutory multiple damages are already being used by the federal
government as well as state governments to deter many kinds of
wrongful, intentional conduct. I7 Multiple damages are also intended
to provide additional compensation to plaintiffs, which facilitates the
ability of more deserving plaintiffs to file suit and helps to fully
compensate those who do so and prevail. 18 While most attorneys are
aware of a handful of federal statutes that provide for treble damages,
most notably in the antitrust area, there are also a very large number
of state statutes that allow double or treble damages. 19 Taken as a
whole, these cover a broad range of tortious activity, but within anyone
state, they are so narrow and scattered in their application that they
have little overall impact. 2o
This Article advocates that states' statutes make greater and more
systematic use of multiple damages by extending them to a much
broader range of irt,entional, wrongful conduct. Part II of this Article
will explain why extra-compensatory relief is called for when tortious
conduct is intentional or malicious. Part III will compare punitive
damages, attorney fees, and treble or other multiple damages as possible
sources of additional relief. Part IV will focus on multiple damages. The
Article will examine the range of existing state statutes and discuss why
and how those statutes might be extended to a broader range of
wrongful behavior.

II.

UNDER-COMPENSATION AND UNDER-DETERRENCE IN INTENTIONAL
TORT CASES

Under-Compensation
The primary goal of tort law is to compensate the plaintiff for any
injuries or losses caused by the defendant's actionable conduct,21 and
an important secondary goal is to deter and discourage such conduct by
others who might cause harm. 22 The normal result of a successful tort

A.

16. See infra text accompanying notes 154-57.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 161-70.
18. See infra text accompanying note 169.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 189-230.
20. See id.
21. See sources cited supra note 1.
22. Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort
Litigation System-and Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1150 (1992). Saks proclaims
that "[tJhe substantive rules of tort law exist to serve certain social purposes. The most
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lawsuit is an award of compensatory damages,23 which are intended to
make the plaintiff whole, to the extent possible, and put the plaintiff in
as good a position as before the tort was committed. 24 For example,
compensatory damages may include an amount meant to serve as
reimbursement for out-of-pocket expenses, such as medical bills in a
personal injury case. 25 These damages may also include an amount to
compensate for economic losses, such as loss of income-and potential
income-in a personal injury case,26 loss of the value or use of property
in a conversion or trespass case,27 or loss of work opportunities in a
libel case. 28 Finally, compensatory damages may include an amount
meant to compensate for noneconomic harm, such as pain and suffering
in a personal injury case,29 damage to reputation in a libel case,30 or
emotional suffering in a case of negligent infliction of emotional
distress. 3l
However compensatory damages are measured, the damages are
supposed to compensate the plaintiff entirely for his injury and 10ss.32
For several reasons, however, even when the damages awarded are an
amount adequate to equal the plaintiff's injuries, the plaintiff will not be
fully compensated in the end. The primary reason plaintiffs are

prominent among these are compensating innocent victims for injury and deterring
behavior that presents risks that exceed their social value." [d.
23. See Galligan, supra note 2, at 119.
24. See sources cited supra note 3.
25. DOBBS, supra note 6, at 1049 (''The injured plaintiff is entitled to recover reasonable
medical and other expenses proximately resulting from tortious injury and those that will
probably result in the future."); see also 22 AM. JUR. 20 Damages § 167 (2003).
26. DOBBS, supra note 6, at 1048 (footnotes omitted) ("If the plaintifTis wholly or partly
unable to carry out gainful activity as a result of tortiously inflicted injury, she is entitled
to recover for actual wages and fringe benefits lost or that will be lost in the future."); see
also 22 AM. JUR. 20, supra note 25, §§ 141-142.
27. 22 AM. JUR. 20, supra note 25, § 252. ("[W]hen one is entitled to a judgment for the
conversion of a chattel or the destruction or impairment of any legally protected interest
in land or other thing, he or she may recover the value of the subject matter or of his or
her interest in it.").
28. [d. at § 251 ("Damages for injury to one's reputation, commercial credit and
financial or business standing are recoverable in such actions as libel[J [and) slander.").
29. DOBBS, supra note 6, at 1050 (footnotes omitted) ("The plaintifTis entitled to recover
for all forms of suffering proximately caused by tortious injury, including future suffering.
The pain for which recovery is allowed includes virtually any form of conscious suffering,
both emotional and physical."); see also 22 AM. JUR. 20, supra note 25, § 200.
30. 22 AM. JUR. 20, supra note 25, § 251.
31. See 38 AM. JUR. 20 Fright, Shock, and Mental Disturbance §§ 12-15 (2010).
32. See Seattle First Nat'l Bank v. Shoreline Concrete Co., 588 P.2d 1308, 1312 (Wash.
1978), superseded by statute on other grounds, Act of Apr. 4, 1986, ch. 305, 1986 Wash.
Sess. Laws 1354, as recognized in Kottler v. Washington, 963 P.2d 834 (1998).
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generally not fully compen~ated is that they must pay their attorney fees
out of their recovery.33 Under the "American Rule," each party to a
lawsuit pays its own legal fees,34 unlike in most other countries where
the losing party pays the winning party's fees. 35 The majority of tort
cases are brought on a contingent fee basis, in which attorney fees are
usually determined by contract. 36 This amount is often approximately
one-third of the recovery but can vary depending on how far the lawsuit
has progressed before termination. 37
A second reason that successful plaintiffs are under-compensated is
that in many jurisdictions plaintiffs are not entitled to prejudgment
interest. 3s That is, they are not compensated for the additional loss

33. DOBBS, supra note 6, at 38 ("[TJhe plaintiff who prevails in the litigation may not
be fully compensated after she deducts the costs of attorney fees and other litigation
expense."). In describing "full" compensation for an antitrust victim, an ABA report
determined that it would include the following: "the amount of the economic detriment
suffered; the costs of recovering the award, including both legal fees expended and the
value of employee time and other resources expended for the litigation." ABA Antitrust
Section, Monograph No. 13, Treble-Damages Remedy 44 (1986).
34. Alyeska Pipeline Servo Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975). InAlyeska
Pipeline, the Court stated, "In the United States, the prevailing litigant is ordinarily not
entitled to collect a reasonable attorneys' fee from the loser." Id. The notion articulated
in Alyeska Pipeline "is known as tne 'American rule' (as upposed to the English rule, which
routinely permits fee-shifting) and derives from court-made law." HENRY COHEN, CONGo
RESEARCH SER'i. REPORT FOR CONGRESS, 94-970, AWARDS OF ATTORNEYS' FEES BY FEDERAL
COURTS AND FEDF:RAL AGENCIES 1 (2008). See infra text accompanying notes 120-21 for
a more in-depth discussion of the American rule and its exceptions.
35. RICHARD H. FIELD, BENJAMIN KAPLIN & KEVIN M. CLERMONT, CIVIL PROCEDURE
187 (9th ed. 2007). According to Field, "[iJn most of the rest of the Westem world,
including England, the losing party also pays the attorney's fees of the prevailing party.
Indeed, the so-called American rule against fee-shifting might be better termed the
'American exception.'" Id.
36. DOBBS, supra note 6, at 38 ("[PJlaintiffs' attorneys accept most tort ca:'es on a
contingent, percentage fee.").
37. ABA Antitrust Section, supra note 33, at 46. Plaintiffs' attorney fees are "often a
contingent fee of one-third or more of the total amount recovered." Id. "The percentage
is fIxed or limited in some states, but not in others. It may vary from a low of around 25%
to a high of about 50%; most are probably between these fIgures." DOBBS, supra note 6,
at 38. One study of insurance settlement practices referred to a commonly used measure
of pain and suffering of three times the special damages "as allocating one-third to the
lawyer, one-third to the physician, and one-third to the claimant." Jeffrey O'Connell, A
Proposal to Abolish Defendants' Payment for Pain and Suffering in Return for Payment of
Claimants' Attorneys' Fees, 1981 U. ILL. L. REV. 333, 351 (1981) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
38. See DOBBS, supra note 6, at 1061-62. "The common law rule denied prejudgment
interest altogether except for claims that were liquidated or ascertainable. . .. Most tort
damages were not considered liquidated or ascertainable. Thus prejudgment interest was
denied on personal injury claims, even if they arose under a statute." Id. at 1061. For
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they have suffered by not having the use of the money from the time of
the injury until the time of the judgment. While this may be a lesser
amount than that lost to attorney fees, it can be significant in some
cases when plaintiffs have to wait years after their injuries to settle a
case or receive a judgment. Finally, successful plaintiffs are not
compensated for the collateral costs of the litigation itself, such as time
spent away from work to prepare for and attend depositions and trial. 39
This might suggest that if states were serious about fully compensating plaintiffs, there should be an additional award above and beyond the
amount of the compensatory damages, either in the form of a damage
multiplier or by requiring losing defendants to pay successful plaintiffs'
attorney fees and pre-judgment interest. In the overwhelming majority
of tort cases, however, this has never been the law. 40
The reason why the law generally does not provide for a damage
multiplier in most tort cases probably rests on a sense of fairness.
Although it seems fair to require a negligent defendant to pay for the
plaintiff's injuries and losses, it does not seem fair to have them pay an
amount higher than that. Defendants already have to pay their own
attorney fees and litigation expenses. 41
Furthermore, American
litigation can often be slow and expensive. 42 It would seem unfair to
require defendants, even losing defendants, when their actions were
unintentional, to shoulder the financial burden of the system themselves. 43
Another reason why tort defendants are not generally required to pay
more than the amount of compensatory damages is fear of overdeterrence. 44 Although that topic will be discussed more fully in the
next section,45 the fear of over-deterrence stems from the fact that,
although the law is meant to deter negligent conduct, it is not meant to
discourage worthwhile kinds of conduct that might be performed

certain types of claims, "[slome states have now enacted statutes modifying the common
law rule against prejudgment interest." [d. at 1062.
39. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 914 & cmt. a.
40. But see Gen. Motors Corp., 461 U.S. at 655, 657; Miller, 266 U.S. at 258. The three
major exceptions are punitive damages, attorney fees awards, and treble damages, all of
which will be discussed in this Article. See infra Part III.
41. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 914 & cmt. a.
42. See DOBBS, supra note 6, at 32.
43. Posner uses the spring gun cases (in which innocent trespassers have been injured
in a trap designed to keep out larcenous intruders) as an example of how tort law is ofte:!
the search for "the proper accommodation of two legitimate activities." RICHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 205 (Vicki Been et al. eds., 7th ed. 2007).
44. See id. at 206.
45. See infra Part II.B.
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negligently. 46 Most negligent tortious conduct takes place while the
defendant is engaged in worthwhile activities that are necessary to the
economy, such as running a business, driving a car, or owning a
home. 47 If damages are set too high, defendants could be discouraged
from conducting some of these activities entirely.48
Nevertheless, the unfairness of having the defendant pay more than
the amount of the plaintiff's damages to make the plaintiff whole does
not apply when the defendant's harmful actions are wrongful and
intentional rather than merely negligent. 49 Compare, for example, an
incident when a pedestrian is injured because a driver, in a moment of
inattentiveness, goes through a stop sign with an incident in which the
victim suffers exactly the same injury after being intentionally struck by
an enraged driver. It may be a reasonable decision (although not the
only one) for the law to leave the injured victim less than fully compensated rather than have the negligent driver pay more than the amount
of harm the driver caused. However, in the case of the defendant who
intentionally injures another, it seems more appropriate to "overcharge"
the wrongdoer than to under-compensate the victim. 50

B.

Under-Deterrence

The present system of having defendants pay only the amount of
damages they cause also results in under-deterrence, especially in the

46. See, e.g., C. Gregory Ruffennach, Free Markets, Individual Liberties and Safe Coal
Mines: A Post-Sago Perspective, 111 W. VA. L. REV. 75, 105 & n.179 (2008){discussing coal
mining operations and whether penalties have any effect on "ordinary negligence" involved
in coal mining).
47. See, e.g., Francis Co. v. United States, 267 F.3d 303, 305 (3d Cir. 2001) (plaintiff
sought damages for personal injuries sustained in a car wreck); Kottler, 963 P.2d at 439-40
(plaintiff-passenger injured in wreck when rental van was negligently driven off a
roadway); Seattle First Nat'l Bank, 588 P.2d at 1311 (employee injured while working for
construction company).
48. See POSNER, supra note 43, at 206.
49. See DOBBS, supra note 6, at 1047.
50. POSNER, supra note 43, at 206. Posner states,
We know that in a strict liability case punitive damages would lead to overdeterrenee. Less obviously, the same thing is true in a simple negligence case. [If
punitive damages are added in negligence cases) potential injurers will be induced
to spend more than B on accident prevention, and that is inefficient. But [in)
intentional tort case[s), the danger of deterring socially valuable conduct by
making the damages award greater than L is minimized and other policies come
to the fore, such as making sure that the damages award is an effective deterrent
by resolving all doubts as to the plaintiffs actual damages in his favor; this can
be done by adding a dollop of punitive damages to the estimate of his actual
damages.
Id.
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case if intentional tortS. 51 First, it should be recognized that the
deterrent effect of damages will be stronger on most intentional actions
than on negligent actions. 52 While actors can be encouraged to be more
careful through the imposition of damages, deterrence should be much
stronger in cases when the tortfeaser is making a conscious decision
whether to act. This deterrent effect is especially true in the case of
intentional torts undertaken for financial gain. A defendant company
contemplating fraud, an unfair business practice, or leaving a harmful
product on the market in order to increase profits, may be encouraged
to do so if the defendant believes that the economic gain will exceed any
damages it might have to pay.53 As the amount of damages increases,
the incentive to perform the conduct decreases. 54
There are a number of reasons why the current system produces less
than adequate deterrence of many intentional torts. There may be many
tort victims who are not even aware that they have been injured or are
unable to identify the party who has caused the injury. 55 Additionally,

51. See Kemezy v. Peters, 79 F.3d 33, 34 (7th Cir. 1996).
52. See Ruffennach, supra note 46, at 105. There are many statements by both courts
and commentators that one of the purposes of tort damages is to deter negligent conduct
by defendants. See sources cited supra note 6. Others, however, have recognized that
damages work better to deter intentional conduct. See, e.g., Cotita v. Pharma-Plast, U.S.A.,
Inc., 974 F.2d 598, 600 (5th Cir. 1992) ("The courts determined that the imposition of
comparative negligence would not deter acts that were the result of momentary neglect or
inattention."); Calum Anderson, Insurance Coverage for Employment-Related Litigation:
Connecticut Law, 18 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 199, 244 (1996) ("The basis for such decisions
is that, while punitive damages may serve to deter persons from engaging in intentionally
harmful behavior, these courts believe that it is purely speculative wLether the prohibition
of coverage for punitive damages would deter reckless or grossly negligent conduct.");
Ruffennach, supra note 46, at 105 ("While penalties might be presumed to deter intentional
conduct, it is questionable whether penalties can effectively deter the 'ordinary negligence'
that characterizes most MSHA violations.").
53. See G. Robert Blakey, Of Characterization and Other Matters: Thoughts About
Multiple Damages, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 97, 116 (1997). As Blakey states,
If society authorizes the recovery of only actual damages for deliberate antisocial
conduct engaged in for profit, it lets perpetrators know that if they are caught,
they must return the misappropriated sums. If they are not caught, they may
keep the money. Even if they are caught and sued, they may be able to defeat
some -part of the damage claim or at least compromise it. In short, single damage
recovery provides insufficient economic disincentive to those who would
intentionally engage in such conduct.
Id.
54. See POSNER, supra note 43, at 206 ("I must not be allowed to be indifferent between
stealing and buying my neighbor's car. The damages award must therefore be made
greater than the value of the car, so that I don't consider conversion an acceptable
substitute for purchase.").
55. See Saks, supra note 22, at 1183.
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various studies have shown that only a small percentage of tort victims
even consult a lawyer to attempt to file suit. 56 Of the victims who do
consult a lawyer, many do not have their cases accepted, even if they are
meritorious. 57 Furthermore, plaintiffs may lose their cause of action
due to the statute of limitations or may not be able to produce sufficient
proof of a valid claim. 58
Traditional punishment theory embraces the concept that multiple
damage awards are necessary to provide sufficient punishment to deter
illegal behavior. 59 According to Keith N. Hylton and Thomas J. Miceli,
The notion that damages should be multiplied to make up for
uncertainty in punishment has been around at least since Bentham
(1781). The traditional account of the optimal multiplier is straightforward: if p is the probability of liability, the nllp is the multiplier that
should be applied to the damage judgment. If damages are multiplied
by IIp, then the injurer's expected damage judgment will internalize
the social loss due to his conduct. GO

If one believes there is systematic under-compensation of plaintiffs and
under-deterrence of defendants (and not everyone does),61 this belief

56. See id. (citing several studies showing that only 6% to 10% of negligently injured
plaintiffs filed medical malpractice actions); see also Debra Pogrund Stark & Jessica M.
Choplin, Does Fraud Pay? An Empirical Analysis ofAttorney's Fees Provisions in Consumer
Fraud Statutes, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 483, 490 (2008) (providing that only 2.4% of
consumers who filed complaints for consumer fraud with the FTC consulted with a lawyer).
Many claims cannot be brought because the amount of the claim would notjustify the legal
expenses in bringing them. See id. at 490 n.15 ("The median losses to victims who reported
experiencing one or more of the types of fraud investigated by the FTC lost $220. "i.
57. Saks, supra note 22, at 1191 ("Attorneys may tum cases away for a variety of
reasons. The plaintiff may be thought to be too unsympathetic or unappealing to juries,
the evidence may contain ambiguities, or the attorney may lack the needed experts or
expertise.").
58. See id. at 1186, 1191.
59. See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton & Thomas J. Miceli, Should Tort Damages be Multiplied?,
21 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 388, 388 (2005); JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (J.H. Bums & H.L.A. Hart eds., Methuen & Co.,
Ltd. 1982) (1789).
60. Hylton & Miceli, supra note 59, at 388. For modem applications of this formula
in the civil context, see Mithcell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An
Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869 (1998).
61. See, e.g., Mark B. Greenlee,Kramer v. Java World: Images, Issues, and Idols in the
Debate Over Tort Reform, 26 CAP. U. L. REV. 701, 701 (1997). There is not complete
agreement in the legal community that plaintiffs are generally under-compensated. See
id. at 701, 702 n.6. Much discourse on tort reform has focused on a number of cases
involving victims that seem grossly over-compensated. See id. at 701. Greenlee states,
Stories about frivolous lawsuits have become a staple of our media culture. A $3.4
billion verdict against CSX for a railroad accident in which no one was seriously
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leads to the conclusion that at least with some, if not most or all,
intentional torts, defendants should have to pay plaintiffs something
more than the actual amount of compensatory damages. There are three
ways that the law currently provides for such additional payment, at
least in some cases: punitive damages, multiple (usually treble but
sometimes double) damages, and payment of the opponent's attorney
fees. 62
The next section of this Article will examine in what situations these
alternatives are available, to what extent their use has ameliorated the
problems identified above, whether their use could be increased or
modified to provide additional benefits, and how their use could be
modified.

III.

EXTRA-COMPENSATORY ALTERNATIVES

Punitive Damages
For tort plaintiffs, the oldest form of recovery for "extra-compensatory"
damages is punitive damages. 63 The ability of juries to award punitive
damages, in addition to compensatory damages, dates back to British
common law and is a part of the jurisprudence of almost every state. 64
The purpose of punitive damages is twofold: (1) to punish the defendant

A.

hurt, a $4 million verdict against BMW for a bad paint job, and a $2.9 million
verdict against McDonald's over spilled coffee are just a few of the more prominent
examples of the cases cited by the media as evidence of a legal system run amok.
These stories have altered public perception of the legal system and influenced
legislative initiatives to change our tort laws.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
In fact, most recent tort reform efforts have focused on preventing "over-compensation" of
some victims rather than "under-compensation" of many. See infra text accompanying
notes 76-92, 114-17. These efforts include damage caps on pain and suffering, especially
in medical malpractice cases, and statutory and constitutional restrictions on punitive
damage awards. Id. Most likely, both problems-under-compensation and overcompensation--exist in the system. Accordingly, "[s]ome victims are greatly overcompensated, while others are hardly compensated at all." Hon. William A. Dreier, Reform
of the Personal Injury Damages Delivery System, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 799, 799 (1996).
Nothing in this Article is inconsistent with examining, and correcting if necessary, the
over-compensation of some victims. Instead, the Article focuses on a separate problem, the
under-compensation of many other victims.
62. See Galligan, supra note 2, at 121, 125.
63. See Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1991).
64. See Haslip, 499 U.S. at 15. In Haslip the Supreme Court of the United States
noted that "[p]unitive damages have long been a part of traditional state tort law." Id.
(quoting Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 255 (1984» (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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for serious misconduct resulting in harm and (2) to deter the defendant
and others from engaging in such conduct. 65 Punitive damages are not
awarded for all intentional misconduct; only when the tortfeaser has
engaged in truly reprehensible conduct "that constitutes an extreme
departure from lawful conduct" are punitive damages awarded. 66
Usually, an antisocial mental state is required of the defendant who
engaged in that conduct, such as malice, intent to injure, or other evil
motive. 67
The only recognized purposes of punitive damages have been to deter
and punish, not to provide additional compensation to the plaintiff.68
The Supreme Court has intimated that punitive damages may not
constitutionally be used for compensatory purposes. 69 It is true that
plaintiffs in cases involving punitive damages may receive extra
compensation, but this has been considered a ''windfall'' and a side effect
of the punitive award, not its purpose. 70 The awarding of damages to
one private party to punish and deter another has always been
controversial,71 especially in cases in which the windfall may be many

65. DOBBS, supra note 6, at 1063 ("Courts usually emphasize that punitive damages are
awarded to punish or deter"); see also BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996) ("Punitive
damages may properly be imposed to further a State's legitimate interests in punishing
unlawful conduct and deterring its repetition.").
66. DOBBS, supra note 6, at 1064 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also David G.
Owen, The Moral Foundations of Punitive Damages, 40 ALA. L. REV. 705, 730 (1989).
67. Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 601 A.2d 633, 649-50 (Md. 1992).
68. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 19-20. In approving the jury instructions given for the award
of punitive damages in Haslip, the Supreme Court took note of the fact that the jury had
been instructed that "the purpose of punitive damages [was) 'not to compensate the
plaintiff for any injury' but 'to punish the defendant' and 'for the added purpose of
protecting the public by [deterring) the defendan~ and others from doing such wrong in the
future.'" Id. (second alteration in original).
69. See id.; see also Steven Plitt & Christie L. Kriegsfeld, The Punitive Damages Lottery
Chase is Over: Is There a Regulatory Alternative to the Tort of Common Law Bad Faith and
Does it Provide an Alternative Deterrent?, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1221, 1234 (2005) ("Therefore,
because compensatory damages ... make the plaintiff whole, punitive damages should only
be awarded if the defendant's conduct 'is so reprehensible as to warrant the imposition of
further sanctions to achieve punishment or deterrence.'"). But see DOBBS, supra note 6,
at 1063 nA (citation omitted) ("Courts have also sometimes considered punitive damages
as a source of funds to aid in fInancing costly litigation ... and as a sum added when it is
difficult to be sure that the compensatory award was sufficient and the defendant's conduct
has no redeeming value.").
70. See Haslip, 499 U.S. at 19-20; see also DOBBS, supra note 6, at 1063.
71. See Haslip, 499 U.S. at 8 n.4 (explaining the arguments, dating back to 1872, for
and against the propriety of allowing juries to award punitive damages). Compare, e.g.,
Luther v. Shaw, 147 N.W. 18, 19-20 (1914), with Fay & Ux v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342,382
(1872) ("The idea is wrong. It is a monstrous heresy. It is an unsightly and an unhealthy
excrescence, deforming the symmetry of the body of the law."). In Luther Justice Timlin
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times larger than the compensatory damages award.72 This has led
some states to enact statutes requiring that some or all of the punitive
damages awards be paid to the state as a fine, rather than to the
plaintiff. 73 The perception that many punitive damages awards were
grossly excessive led the Supreme Court to impose constitutional
restrictions on the size of punitive damages awards. 74
Until recently, punitive damages awards had been solely a matter of
state law, not subject to any federal constitutional scrutiny.75 However,
in the late 1980s, some Justices on the Supreme Court expressed their
perception that both the number and size of punitive damages awards
were "skyrocketing" and required better judicial oversight. 76 Then, in
a line of cases in the 1990s, the Supreme Court imposed constitutional
restrictions on the awarding of punitive damages. 77
In Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip,78 the Supreme Court,
although reaffirming that punitive damages did not violate either the
Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines Clause79 or the Fourteenth

explained,
Speaking for myself only in this paragraph, ... giving exemplary damages is an
outgrowth of the English love of liberty regulated by law. It tends to elevate the
jury as a responsible instrument of government, discourages private reprisals,
restrains the strong, influential, and unscrupulous, vindicates the right of the
weak, and encourages recourse to, and confidence in, the courts of law by those
wronged or oppressed by acts or practices not cognizable in, or not sufficiently
punished, by the criminal law.
147 N.W. at 19-20.
72. See, e.g., BMW, 517 U.S. at 565. In BMW the jury awarded $4 million in punitive
damages, 1000 times the compensatory damages of $4000. [d. In her dissenting opinion
in Haslip, Justice O'Conner cited Alabama verdicts awarding punitive damages of $10
million, $25 million, and $50 million, referring to the fact that in one nine month period
in 1990, "there were no fewer than six punitive damages awards of more than $20 million."
499 U.S. at 47,61 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
73. E.g., IOWA CODE § 668A.1 (2009), available at http://www.legis.state.ia.uslIowaLaw
.html (75% or more of a punitive damage award to a state agency except when the tort is
"directed at" the plaintifl); OR. REV. STAT. § 31.735 (2009), available at http://www.leg.sta
te.or.uslorsl031.html (60% of a punitive damage award to a state agency).
74. See infra text accompanying notes 78-92.
75. See, e.g., Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 259-60
(1989).
76. [d. at 282-83 (1989) (O'Conner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
77. See infra text accompanying notes 78-92.
78. 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
79. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fmes
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."). As to the excessive fmes clause,
the Supreme Court in Haslip reaffirmed the earlier holding in Browning-Ferris that "the
Eighth Amendment did not apply to a punitive damages award in a civil case between
private parties." 499 U.S. at 9 (citing Browning·Ferris, 492 U.S. at 259-60).
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Amendment Due Process Clause,8o decided that due process did impose
some procedural restrictions on such awards. 81 First, the jury must be
instructed that the only purpose of punitive damages is to punish and
deter,82 and second, states must provide post-trial review of the
awarding and amount of punitive damages to make sure they are
commensurate with the reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct. 83
The Supreme Court determined that the Alabama jury instructions
provided sufficient guidance on punitive damages and that the Alabama
procedures for judicial review ofthe reasonableness of punitive damages
awards was sufficient to comply with due process. 84 Therefore, the
Court upheld the punitive damages award, which was four times the
amount of the compensatory damages. 85 However, the Court did
indicate that an award of four times the compensatory damages may
have come close to violating due process. 86
In BMW v. Gore,87 the Supreme Court made clear that excessive
punitive damages awards violated due process, even if proper procedures
had been followed. 88 The plaintiff sued an auto maker for repairing
and selling cars that had been damaged by acid rain without informing
customers of the damage and repair. The plaintiff was originally
awarded $4 million in punitive damages, but the award was subsequently lowered by the Alabama Supreme Court to $2 million, which was
approximately 500 times larger than his compensatory damages. 89

80. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV ("[N)or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process oflaw. "). The Supreme Court noted that "the common-law
method for assessing punitive damages was well established before the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted." Haslip, 499 U.S. at 17. The Supreme Court also determined that
"every state and federal court that has considered the question has ruled that the commonlaw method for assessing punitive damages does not in itself violate due process." [d. The
Supreme Court held that the common-law method of assessing punitive damages was not
"so inherently unfair as to deny due process and be per se unconstitutional." Id.
81. Id. at 12, 19-21.
82. Id. at 19-20.
83. Id. at 20-21 ("This appellate review makes certain that the punitive damages are
reasonable in their amount and rational in light of their purpose to punish what has
occurred and to deter its repetition.").
84. Id. at 22-24 ("Pacific Mutual thus had the benefit of the full panoply of Alabama's
procedural protections.").
85. Id. at 23-24. The general verdict for the plaintiff of $1,040,000 "contained a
punitive damages component of not less than $840,000." Id. at 6 & n.2.
86. Id. at 23-24. ("We are aware that the punitive damages award in this case is more
than 4 times the amount of compensatory damages, ... [and even though it) may be close
to the line, ... it does not cross the line into the area of constitutional impropriety.").
87. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
88. Id. at 585-86.
89. Id. at 563 & n.1, 565,567.
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The Supreme Court held that the award was "grossly excessive" and
that the punitive damages were therefore unconstitutiona1. 90 The
Supreme Court stated that "[e]lementary notions of fairness enshrined
in our constitutional jurisprudence dictate that a person receive fair
notice not only of the conduct that will subject him to punishment, but
also of the severity of the penalty that a State may impose. ~l The
Supreme Court announced three guideposts that state courts must follow
to determine whether punitive damages awards are unconstitutionally
excessive: (1) "the degree of reprehensibility" of the defend~nt's conduct;
(2) "the disparity between the harm or potential harm suffered by [the
claimant) and [the amount of the) punitive ... award; and (3) the
difference between [the punitive award) and [any) civil [or criminal)
penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases.'>92 The overall
effect of the line of Supreme Court punitive damages cases has been to
constitutionally limit the awarding of punitive damages to cases
involving truly reprehensible conduct. 93 These cases have also limited
the size of punitive damages awards to virtually never more than ten
times the amount of compensatory damages, although the punitive
awards are usually no more than four times the compensatory
amount. 94
The Supreme Court may have been right that some state punitive
damages awards have been excessive and may also have been correct in
putting limits on the size of such awards. However, for the purposes of
the problems addressed in this Article (under-compensation and underdeterrence in the majority of intentional tort cases), the issue of
excessive awards is not particularly relevant. Although some awards
may have been excessive, there have been many more victims of
intentional torts who have received no-or at least very modest-punitive
damages awards. 95
Much of the evidence cited by those who argue that punitive damages
awards have gotten out of control is anecdota1. 96 Although some

90. ld. at 585-86.
91. ld. at 574.
92. ld. at 574-75.
93. See, e.g., id. at 575, 580.
94. See, e.g., id. at 581-82.
95. See, e.g., Van Eaton v. Thon, 764 S.W.2d 674, 676-77 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (awarding
plaintiff only $500 in punitive damages awards).
96. Saks, supra note 22, at 1159-62. As Saks noted, "The use of anecdotal evidence has
been unusually popular in discussions about the nature of the litigation system. Anecdotes
about undeserving plaintiffs are intriguing or outrageous and have been repeated often in
the media. Consequently, people readily believe that the category of undeserving plaintiffs
dominates the system." ld. at 1159, 1161 (footnotes omitted).
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awards have certainly been grossly excessive, virtually every systematic
study of the issue found that punitive damages awards were made in a
very small percentage of cases. 97 In cases when punitive damages were
awarded, the overwhelming majority of the awards were modest in
amount, usually not more than one or two times the compensatory
damages. 98 Michael J. Saks points out that
according to Justice O'Conner: "Awards of punitive damages are
skyrocketing." Brief after amicus brief submitted to the Supreme
Court in a recent punitive damages case asserted that punitive
damages are more frequent, more extreme, and more outlandish ....
But every empirical study of the question has reached conclusions that,
to say the least, fail to support these beliefs [that the number and size
of punitive damages awards have increased greatly]. In Rand's
research on accidental personal injury trials in Cook County, Illinois,
and San Francisco, the proportion of cases in which punitive damages
were awarded was small and had risen little in the twenty-five years
from 1960 to 1984. 99

The fact is that punitive damages have never been an effective remedy
for the vast majority of intentional tort victims, and in fairness, they
were never intended to be. These damages apply only when the
defendant's conduct is truly reprehensible and deserving of punishment,
not when it was merely intentional and blameworthy.loo In most
cases, the plaintiff who has b~en injured by intentional and wrongful
actions that do not rise to the high level of wrongfulness required for
punitive damages will receive no help from this remedy. Even when the
injured plaintiff alleges conduct by the defendant that would be
deserving of punitive damages, the plaintiff must often prove this
allegation by the heightened standard of clear and convincing evidence. lOl In addition, the jury is instructed that even if they find the

97. See, e.g., id. at 1254-55, 1257-59 (discussing studies by Stephen Daniels and
Joanne Martin as well as William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, to name a few);
Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Determining Punitive Damages: Empirical Insights and
Implications for Reform, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 103, 161-62 (discussing studies by the RAND
Corporation, the Bureau of Justice Statistics, and the national Center for State Courts,
among others).
98. Saks, supra note 22, at 1260-61.
99. Id. at 1254 (footnotes omitted); see also Robbennolt, supra note 97, at 159
("Archival research examining overall patterns of awards find that punitive damages are
infrequently awarded, moderate in size, awarded in response to outrageous conduct, and
often reduced post-triaL").
100. Robbennolt, supra note 97, at 111.
101. See, e.g., Omni Ins. Co. v. Foreman, 802 So. 2d 195, 196 (Ala. 2001); Brandner v.
Hudson, 171 P.3d 83, 85 (Alaska 2007); Linthicum v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 723 P.2d
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defendant's conduct reprehensible, deserving of punishment, and needing
deterrence, the award is still discretionary-the jury can still decline to
impose punitive damages. 102 Further, all evidence seems to show that
these restrictions on awarding punitive damages have an impact in a
tiny percentage of all torts, including a comparably small percentage of
intentional torts, leading to any punitive award at all. 103
It may be that in the past, punitive damages-or the threat of
them-had the most widespread effect in settlement negotiations. 104
Defendants who feared their conduct could be viewed as reprehensible
by the jury had a strong incentive to settle the case. If the case went to
trial, a defendant was taking the risk of having the jury make a very
large punitive damages award. Thus, the threat of a possible punitive
award many times the amount of the plaintiff's damages might have
served as a strong incentive to settle such cases at a level close to the
actual damages. Although the risk remains, it is a much less dangerous
choice to go to trial and will be less of a settlement incentive now that
virtually all punitive awards will be less than four times the amount of
the actual damages. 105

675, 681 (Ariz. 1986).
102. See Smith's Food & Drug Ctrs., Inc. v. Bellegarde, 958 P.2d 1208 (Nev. 1998)
(asserting that even if the jury finds malice, they are not required to assess punitive
damages), overruled on other grounds by Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v. Thitchener, 192
P.3d 243 (Nev. 2008); DOBBS, supra note 6, at 1062 (footnote omitted) ("In the great
majority of states, the common law rule permits but does not require juries to assess
punitive damages in special cases.").
103. See Robbennolt, supra note 97, at 159.
104. See Saks, supra note 22, at 1286-87. Saks argues,
Where a deterrence system directly touches only a fraction of the cases it is
intended to have impact upon, it needs to fmd a way to make up for the reduced
probability that any potential injurer will feel its effects. One obvious solution
would be to multiply penalties so that the cost of doing harm discounied by the
probability of being held to account for that harm still amounts to a deterrent-if
you are not going to hit often, hit hard. But the data strongly suggest that our
tort system hits infrequently and lightly. Yet, it has nevertheless somehow
succeeded in frightening a great many potential defendants, who seem to go to
considerable lengths to avoid becoming actual defendants. Somehow people have
come to overestimate vastly the tort system's vigilance and the magnitude of its
sanctions.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
105. At first blush, it may seem unfair for a defendant to settle a case, perhaps at a
figure closer to compensatory damages, out of fear of an excessive punitive damagp.s award.
But if a defendant's conduct is reprehensible enough for the defendant to be worried about
a huge punitive damage award, it is likely that at the very least, the defendant would or
should be responsible for paying the piaintifl's compensatory damages.
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Since one of the main purposes of punitive damages is to deter
unlawful conduct, one would expect that these damages would be more
effective at deterrence than at compensating plaintiffs. Yet even in this
regard, there are several reasons why punitive damages might not be as
effective as one would hope. First, since they are directed only at truly
reprehensible conduct, punitive damages do nothing to deter unlawful
behavior that does not rise to this level. For example, the threat of
punitive damages might deter an auto maker from saving money by
knowingly installing cheaper, inferior brakes, knowing that a small
number of the brakes might fail, causing injury or death to drivers.
Even if the auto maker determined that the cost savings would exceed
the amount of actual injury that would be caused, the auto maker could
be deterred by the possibility of much higher punitive damages.
However, if the auto maker determined it could save money by installing
a cheaper, inferior part (although the part would not cause injury or
death), which might lead to expensive repair bills, it might conceal the
use of the .part from consumers if it believed paying for damages would
cost less than installing a better part. That might be the case if the auto
makers determined that this conduct was not sufficiently reprehensible
to warrant punitive damages.
Law and economy theory might say that there is nothing wrong with
this result. An "efficient" tort system should not force the auto maker
to make corrective changes that would cost more than the costs of not
fixing the problem. 106 This theory may be true if the only consideration is overall cost to the system, without consideration offairness and
morality. This is somewhat obvious when it comes to the example
involving the brakes.
As a society, we might-and probably
should-decide to force manufacturers to make changes that will avoid
serious injuries and death, even if the cost of these changes is greater
than the cost of compensating the victims of the dangerous product. 107

106. See POSNER, supra note 43, at 168 ("This example shows that expected accident
costs ... must be compared at the margin, by measuring the costs and benefits of small
increments in safety and stopping investing in more safety at the point where another
dollar spent would yield a dollar or less in added safety.").
107. See id. at 27 (admitting that "there is more to justice than economics"). Posner
further states, "Since economics does not answer the question whether the existing
distribution of income and wealth is good or bad, just or unjust ... , neither does it answer
the ultimate question whether an efficient allocation of resources would be socially or
ethically desirable." RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 14 (4th ed. 1992)
(footnote omitted). Another scholar contends, "[Elconomic analysis says little about ethics
beyond pricing. In short, economic analysis often knows the price of everything and the
value of nothing." Blakey, supra note 53, at 98 (footnote omitted).
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The unfairness is not quite as obvious in the example when the harm
is only economic, and the cost of repairing the failed part is lower than
the cost of making one that doesn't fail. While the total cost of the
repairs versus the cost of the pre-sale fix might be lower, it comes down
to a question of who is saddled with the cost. Although this method is
cost-efficient, the question is whether it is fair to pass the cost of fixing
the problem from the manufacturer to the consumers, especially if the
defect has been hidden from them. Although the company might have
to reimburse the consumers in some cases, either through warranty
work, suits, or threats of suits, there will also be many consumers who
might be stuck with the cost ofthe fix ifthey do not realize the company
should be responsible.
This is not to advocate a tort system that requires a zero failure rate
manufacturing product. But when a company makes efforts to conceal
actual defects, hoping to pass the cost on to consumers, the company's
conduct rises to the level of fraud or deceit, and extra-compensatory
damages are justified as deterrence. This kind of behavior, however, will
not normally result in punitive damages.
It is possible that sufficient deterrence may result from the fact that
there is at least some risk that a jury will consider such willful
concealment of defects worthy of punitive damages. In fact, one could
argue that this was the result in BMW when the jury imposed significant punitive damages for the company's failure to disclose the damage
and repair of the vehicles. 108 Forgetting for a moment that because of
the result in BMW, such a large punitive award would no longer be
available, even under pre-BMW law, the threat of punitive damages
might not have been sufficient to deter such conduct (namely, wrongful,
and perhaps fraudulent, conduct).
The somewhat remote threat of a very large punitive damages award
suffers from a similar problem as the death penalty in regards to its
deterrent effect.109 Most psychological research shows that smaller but
more certain punishment has a higher deterrent value than harsher but

108. 517 U.S. at 565.
109. See POSNER, supra note 43, at 225 ("Common sense suggests that if it were
routinely imposed, capital punishment would indeed deter because of people's dread of
death. . .. But partly because of procedural restrictions imposed by the Supreme Court,
capital punishment is so rarely imposed that the prospect of it is unlikely to deter."). No
rational criminal should be deterred by the death penalty because the punishment is too
distant and unlikely to merit much attention. STEVEN D. LEVITI & STEPHEN J. DUBNER,
FREAKONOMICS: A ROGUE ECONOMIST EXPLORES THE HIDDEN SIDE OF EVERYTHING 112
(2006).
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infrequently imposed punishment. 110 In addition, since BMW, whatever in terrorem effect the possibility of huge punitive damages awards
had on defendants' behavior has been mostly removed. 111
It is also very unlikely that any state would be willing to expand the
law of punitive damages to cover a broader range of intentional torts
that do not rise to the level of reprehensible behavior. Even after
excessive awards have been reigned in by the BMW line of cases,
punitive damages remain unpopular politically. 112 The trend has been
to restrict punitive awards in both amount and scope rather than to
increase them.1l3 Some states have enacted caps on punitive damages 114 or required that part or all of the damages be paid to the
state. 115 Other states have made it harder to obtain an award in the

110. See, e.g., John M. Darley, On the Unlikely Prospect of Reducing Crime Rates by
Increasing the Severity of Prison Sentences, 13 J.L. & POL'y 189, 200-01 (2005). Darley
points out,
As Jeremy Bentham noted, the deterrent weight of punishment is a complex
function of the severity of the punishment, the probability of receiving the
punishment, and, finally, the anticipated delay between the act and the receipt of
the punishment. Psychological research in the last decades has demonstrated that
the anticipation of rewards and punishments in the future has startlingly little
effect on human behavior when compared to rewards and punishments in the
present. To a drug addict, the threat of a future prison sentence is less of a
concern when compared to the desire for the "rock" of cocaine that the robbery will
pay for. Other governmental regimes, realizing this, have traded off due process
concerns for regimes of summary punishment-immediate executions of those
caught in the process of (what might or might not be) a crime. It is to the credit
of our legislatures that they generally have not chosen this option. But the cost
of that choice is this: the threat of punishment is greatly attenuated by being
mentally represented as taking place far in the future.
Id.
111. See Plitt & Kriegsfeld, supra note 69, at 1223 ("The recent pronouncements of the
United States Supreme Court in the area of punitive damages has called into question the
continued vitality of punitive damages as a mechanism of deterrence to insurance company
misconduct. ").
112. See, e.g., Hans von Spakovsky, Punitive Damages and the Tax Code: Punishing
Business and the Economy, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION (Nov. 15, 2010), http://www.heri
tage.org!researchlreportsl2010/111punitive-damages-and-the-tax-code-punishing-businessand-the-economy.
113. See infra text accompanying notes 114-17.
114. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STATS. ANN. § 13-21-102 (2010), available at http://www.mich
ie.comlColoradollpext.dll?f=templates&fn=main-h.htm&cp= (not more than amount of
compensatory damages depending on the situation); N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A: 15-5.14 (West 2000
& Supp. 2010) ("five times the liability ... for compensatory damages or $350,000,
whichever is greater").
115. See sources cited supra note 73.
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first place by either raising the substantive standard 1l6 or by raising
procedural hurdles. 1l7
Another problem with the use of punitive damages for deterrent effect
is that since these awards apply only to truly reprehensible conduct, in
many cases such conduct would already subject the defendant to
criminal penalties or at least civil fines. H8 Therefore, punitive damages are often applicable in cases when the law already provides significant deterrent effect, and any additional deterrent they provide is likely
to be marginal.
In summation, punitive damages do provide some deterrent effect on
truly reprehensible conduct. They also provide additional compensation
for at least some victims of the worst kind of behavior as well as some
settlement leverage for those victims. However, they do very little to
deter wrongful conduct that does not rise to this level of heinousness,
and they do not provide much in the way of compensation for victims in
such cases.

B.

Attorney Fees

In American jurisprudence, all parties normally pay their own
attorney fees. 119 As stated by the Supreme Court in the 1975 case
Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society,I20 "In the United
States, the prevailing litigant is ordinarily not entitled to collect a
reasonable attorneys' fee from the loser."l21 This procedure is called
the "American Rule" and differs from the "English Rule," which normally
provides for fee-shifting. 122 Since one of the main reasons plaintiffs
are not fully compensated in successful tort suits is that they must pay
a significant portion of their recovery in attorney fees, one way to

116. See, e.g., Owens-Illinois, 601 A.2d at 652. In Owens-Illinois, the Maryland Court
of Appeals reversed a line of cases that had allowed punitive damages in cases of implied
malice and held that plaintiffs in all cases must prove "actual malice." Id. at 652. The
court of appeals explained that in products liability cases, the defendant must have
knowledge ofthe defect and show conscious or deliberate disregard of the foreseeable harm
resulting from the defect. Id. at 653. Merely having constructive knowledge-"should have
known"-of the conduct is not sufficient. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
117. See, e.g., Darcars Motors of Silver Spring, Inc. v. Borzym, 841 A.2d 828, 838 (Md.
2004) (internal quotation marks omitted) (requiring that proof of the elements of punitive
damages must be "by 'clear' and convincing evidence"); see also supra text accompanying
note 101.
118. See infra note 236 (examples of state statutes providing multiple damages for
actions which would constitute criminal violations).
119. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 914 & cmt. a.
120. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
121. Id. at 247.
122. See COHEN, supra note 34, at 1.

470

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

remedy that under-compensation would be to reject, in whole or in part,
the American Rule and allow for fee-shifting. Fee-shifting can be either
two-way (in which both prevailing plaintiffs and defendants are normally
entitled to fees-the British Rule)123 or one-way (in which prevailing
plaintiffs are normally entitled to fees, but prevailing defendants may
only recover if the lawsuit was frivolous or brought in bad faith).124
A true two-way fee-shifting statute would be "incompatible with the
policy of affording good faith plaintiffs unencumbered access to the civil
remedy system."125 Plaintiffs with good faith, meritorious claims
would be discouraged from bringing those claims for fear of financial
ruin if they lost. At least one empirical study has shown that both
consumers and attorneys were less willing to bring even "a strong
meritorious case" under a consumer protection statute that permitted
the court, in its discretion, to award attorney fees to prevailing
defendants. 126 Most efforts to adopt a two-way "loser pays" rule have
come from conservative politicians who claim that the rule is necessary
to discourage frivolous or fraudulent suits. 127
The other, more common type of fee-shifting statute is a one-way feeshifting statute that regularly awards fees to a prevailing plaintiff but
to a prevailing defendant only ifthe suit was frivolous or brought in bad
faith. 128 This system promotes the goal of providing access to the
courts for plaintiffs with meritorious cases while discouraging frivolous

123. Gregory A. Hicks, Statutory Damage Caps Are an Incomplete Reform: A Proposal
for Attorney Fee Shifting in Tort Actions, 49 LA. L. REV. 763, 795 (1989).
124. See Stark & Choplin, supra note 56, at 516.
125. Hicks, supra note 123, at 790.
For example, an essential characteristic of the American tort litigation system, one
that is relevant to the choice of an appropriate fee shifting system for personal
injury litigation, is its strong preference in favor of unencumbered access to
remedies by good faith plaintiffs. The American tort system is designed to
compensate injuries and to reduce the risk of injuries caused by legally responsible
actors. To accomplish these goals, the system must encourage plaintiffs' actions
that may prove to be unsuccessful. ... Although a satisfactory fee shifting system
must include some mechanism for promoting just settlements, deterring frivolous
claims, and eliminating abusive trial tactics by plaintiffs and defendants alike, the
system should accomplish these goals in a way that allows the plaintiff to
undertake good faith litigation of uncertain outcome.
Id. (footnote omitted).
126. Stark & Choplin, supra note 56, at 516.
127. See, e.g., COHEN, supra note 34, at 1. A "loser pays" rule was included in the Bush
Administration's tort-reform legislation in 1992, and in "'The Common Sense Legal
Reforms Act,' which is part of the 'Contract With America' proposed by ... Republican
House Members in 1994." [d.
128. See Stark & Choplin, supra note 56, at 516.
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or fraudulent litigation. 129 Such a one-way statute might appear to
treat defendants unfairly and accord plaintiffs a favored status. As
stated by one commentator, however,
'!\vo-way indemnity systems rest upon the assumption that prevailing
plaintiffs and prevailing defendants have an equal entitlement, as
winners, to compensation for the expenses of successful litigation. The
injury-compensation orientation of modern American tort law, however,
is at odds with this assumption and supplies a rationale for distinguishing between winning plaintiffs' fee claims and winning defendants' fee claims. 130
Although one-way fee-shifting statutes have the effect of increasing
plaintiffs' net compensation ifthey prevail, the primary purpose of most
one-way statutes has been to facilitate bringing the lawsuit in the first
place by helping prospective plaintiffs find competent attorneys in cases
in which they might otherwise be hard to attract. 131 Such cases could
include situations when the amount of damages is very low-or low in
comparison to the resources needed to bring suit-or when the primary
relief sought is injunctive.
Starting in the 1970s, the federal government and many states began
enacting attorney fees statutes based on a private attorney general
doctrine. 132 This concept provides that a plaintiff "should be awarded
attorneys' fees when he has effectuated a strong Congressional policy
which has benefited a large class of people, and where further[ing] the
necessity and financial burden of private enforcement are such as to
make the award essential.,,133
Although the Supreme Court disallowed court-imposed fee-shifting
when there was no statutory authorization in Alyeska/ 34 in Newman
v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc.,135 the Court approved the use of the
private attorney general theory when used as the basis of statutory
fees. 136 In Newman the Supreme Court stated,

129. See id. One empirical study showed that even such a one-way statute discouraged
lawyers from bringing meritorious claims involving a good-faith extension of the law for
fear that it would be deemed frivolous. [d.
130. Hicks, supra note 123, at 795.
131. See, e.g., Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968); see also
COHEN, supra note 34, at Summary, 1.
132. See, e.g., La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94, 98 (N.D. Cal. 1972), affd, 488 F.2d
559 (9th Cir. 1973), overruled by W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83 (1991).
133. [d.
134. 421 U.S. at 247.
135. 390 U.S. 400 (1968).
136. [d. at 402.
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If successful plaintiffs were routinely forced to bear their own

attorneys' fees, few aggrieved parties would be in a position to advance
the public interest by invoking the injunctive powers of the federal
courts. Congress therefore enacted the provision for counsel fees ...
to encourage individuals injured by racial discrimination to seek
judicial relief under Title 11.137
At present there are approximately two hundred federal fee-shifting
statutes l38 and numerous such state statutes. 139 Most of these
were generally enacted to encourage private litigation to implement
public policy. Awards of attorneys' fees are often designed to help to
equalize contests between private individual plaintiffs and corporate or
governmental defendants. Thus, attorneys' fees provisions are most
often found in civil rights, environmental protection, and consumer
protection statutes. 140
Many of these statutes-including the civil rights statutes-were written
in language that would appear to make them discretionary, two-way feeshifting statutes providing that the court may allow fees to prevailing
parties but making no distinction between plaintiffs and defendants. 14l
The Supreme Court, however, has recognized that the purpose of most
fee-shifting statutes is to enable deserving plaintiffs to bring suit l42
and has established different standards for awards to plaintiffsl43 and
defendants. 144 Prevailing plaintiffs ordinarily recover fees "unless
special circumstances would render such an award unjust,"145 whereas
prevailing defendants recover fees only upon a showing that the "action
was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.,,146
Fee-shifting statutes have been a successful, accepted way of
furthering important government policies in areas such as civil rights,

137. Id.
138. COHEN, supra note 34, at Summary, 64-114; 1 ROBERT L. ROSSI, ATTORNEYS' FEES
6-23 to 6-24 (3d ed. 2002).
139. 2 ROBERT L. ROSSI, ATIORNEYS' FEES 11-9 & n.8 (3d ed. 2002).
140. COHEN, supra note 34, at Summary.
141. See, e.g., Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976,42 U.S.C. § 1988(b)
(2006) ("[TJhe court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United
States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs."). But see 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2006)
(providing attorney fees in antitrust cases only to prevailing claimants).
142. See, e.g., Newman, 390 U.S. at 402; Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434
U.S. 412,420 (1978).
143. See, e.g., Newman, 390 U.S. at 402; Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 416-17 (quoting
Newman, 390 U.S. at 402).
144. Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 421.
145. Newman, 390 U.S. at 402.
146. Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 421.
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environmental harms, and consumer protection. 147 These statutes
have generally not been used in other private disputes involving a
broader range of intentional wrongdoing. 148 The one-sided nature of
the provisions necessary to make fee-shifting statutes useful to plaintiffs
might be viewed as unfair if used in truly private disputes, in which no
important governmental interests are at stake. 149 However, this view
would limit the use of these statutes in ameliorating the problem of
general under-compensation and under-deterrence in a wide range of
intentional torts addressed in this Article.
Defendants have challenged one-way fee-shifting statutes as unconstitutional, violating equal protection and due process, and as susceptible
to attack as being "class" or "special" legislation. 150 Although the
majority of these challenges have been unsuccessful,151 a number of
states have held at least some fee-shifting statutes unconstitutional. 152
In upholding one-way fee-shifting statutes, courts often cite the strong
public interest behind them. 153

147. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (2006); Truth in
Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (2006); Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2060(c)
(2006); Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2618(d) (2006); Endangered Species Act,
16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(4) (2006); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C.
§ 626(b) (2006). For a complete list offederal fee-shifting statutes, see COHEN, supra note
34, at 64-114.
148. See Annotation, Validity of Statute Allowing Attorney's Fee to Successful Claimant
but not to Defendant, or Vice Versa, 73 A.L.R. 3d 515, 522 (1976).
149. See Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994). In Fogerty the Supreme Court
distinguished statutes "in the civil rights context," which regularly award attorney fees to
"impecunious 'private attorney general' plaintiffs," from cases of copyright, patent, and
trademark infringement, in which fee awards are "party-neutral" and often limited to
'''exceptional cases.'" Id. at 524, 525 n.12. The Supreme Court noted that in such cases,
"defendants who seek to advance a variety of meritorious copyright defenses should be
encouraged to litigate them to the same extent that plaintiffs are encouraged to litigate
meritorious claims of infringement." Id. at 527.
150. 73 A.L.R.3d, supra note 148, at 521-22.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 535. The greatest number of such cases were those holding statutes
unconstitutional that provided for attorney fees to plaintiffs for successfully establishing
mechanics liens. See, e.g., Builders' Supply Depot v. O'Connor, 88 P. 982, 983 (Cal. 1907);
Becker v. Hopper, 138 P. 179, 179, 182 (Wyo. 1914). Other statutes were ruled
unconstitutional for allowing fees to plaintiffs that successfully sued railroad companies
for $50 or less for services rendered, damages, freight overcharges, or livestock killed by
trains. See, e.g., Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 150, 166 (1897). Other
unconstitutional statutes include those for any plaintiff suing for compensation for services
rendered. See, e.g., Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Mashore, 96 P. 630, 633 (Okla. 1908).
153. See 73 A.L.R.3d 515, supra note 148, at 522. Courts upholding such statutes often
noted
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There are some additional problems with extending the use of feeshifting statutes. They generate an enormous amount of litigation
concerning the propriety and amount of attorney fees in individual
cases. 154 Fee-shifting statutes also are not designed to serve as a
deterrent to improper conduct by defendants. 155 They do have some
deterrent effect by allowing more plaintiffs to bring suit; however, the
extent of payment by the defendant is not based upon the harm inflicted
by the defendant's behavior but on the extent of the litigation. 156 In
cases with small amounts of damages in which the attorney fees could
greatly exceed the amount of harm, fee-shifting statutes should provide
a deterrent effect. Defendants, for better or worse, are at least partially
in control of the amount of the extra award by choosing how vigorously
they defend the suit. This control can have the positive aspect of
encouraging settlement but also the negative aspect of reducing the
deterrent value of fee-shifting statute by allowing defendants to
minimize the amount of the additional award, and therefore the
deterrent effect of that award, by settling. In fact, fee-shifting statutes
may be better at deterring over-litigation by defendants than deterring
the original harmful behavior. 157
There is an additional problem with extending attorney fees beyond
the private attorney general theory into broader tort litigation. Under
most federal fee-shifting statutes, fees are not calculated as a percentage

that many of the particular types of statutes relate to activities in which the state
has a strong public policy interest, so that requiring the unsuccessful defendant
to pay the plaintiffs attorneys' fees in litigation between the parties also aids the
state in enforcement of statutes enacted under the police power of the state[s].
[d. The number of cases holding fee-shifting statutes unconstitutional is small, and many
of them are quite old. [d. at 535-36. This might indicate that extending attorney fees
statutes into areas not involving strong public interest might not be viewed today as
unconstitutional; however, they still might be viewed as unfair.
154. See Dan B. Dobbs, Awarding Attorney Fees Against Adversaries: Introducing the
Problem, 1986 DUKE L.J. 435, 489 ("The present fee-flxing process is not a very good one.
Arriving at an accurate and reasonable fee award requires much time and effort. Thus
after the flrst litigation comes a second, with added costs and fee awards of its own."); see
also THEODORE EISENBERG, CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 611 (5th ed.
2004) ("Much civil rights litigation is about calculating attorneys' fees."). One civil rights
hornbook devotes almost thirty pages to discussing hundreds of federal cases interpreting
the awarding of attorney fees in civil rights cases. HAROLD S. LEWIS, JR. & ELIZABETH J.
NORMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS LAw AND PRACTICE 341-68 (2d ed. 2004).
155. See Dobbs, Awarding Attorney Fees Against Adversaries, supra note 154, at 444.
156. See id. at 462, 478, 480-8l.
157. See Hicks, supra note 123, at 786 ("[A]wards of attorneys' fees could be more
effective ... at causing defendants to move promptly towards reasonable settlements.
Unreasonable delays could result in increased plaintiffs legal fees, placing a premium on
prompt resolution of disputes and attaching a cost to unreasonable delay.").
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of the plaintiff's recovery but as a "lodestar" of hours reasonably spent
on the successful claims, multiplied by the market rate for attorneys of
similar skill and experience in that area. 158 This calculation sometimes results in fee awards that are much larger than the compensatory
award to the plaintiff. 159 Courts have been willing to accept large
attorney fees awards in cases in which important federal rights are
being enforced. 160 Such awards, however, might be viewed as excessive
if made in more "run-of-the-mill" intentional torts cases.

Multiple (Double or Treble) Damages
A third option would be to provide for multiple damages in some or all
cases in which defendants acted intentionally and wrongfully. Multiple
damages are not a new concept, with origins dating back to the laws of
ancient Greece and Rome: "The earliest multiple damage provision in
Anglo-American law was the Statute of Cloucester in 1278."161 There
are many modern examples of multiple damage statutes, the most wellknown of which provides for treble damages for violations of federal
antitrust laws. 162
C.

158. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 888, 895 (1984); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S.
424,433 (1983); Dobbs, Awarding Attorney Fees Against Adversaries, supra note 154, at
467.
159. See, e.g., City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561 (1986). In Rivera the Supreme
Court approved a fee award of more than $245,000 in a civil rights case in which only
$33,350 had been awarded in total damages. [d. at 564-67. Although the Court noted that
the amount of damages awarded under the Civil Rights Attorneys Fees Awards Act is
relevant to the amount of attorney fees, it is only one factor to be considered, and the fees
need not be proportionate to the amount of damages. [d. at 574. The Court explicitly
distinguished civil rights actions from "a private tort suit benefiting only the individual
plaintiffs whose rights were violated. Unlike most private tort litigants, a civil rights
plaintiff seeks to vindicate important civil and constitutional rights that cannot be valued
solely in monetary terms." [d.
160. See, e.g., Rivera, 477 U.S. at 564-65,567 (award of over $245,000 in attorney fees
for plaintiffs suing for civil rights violations).
161. Blakey, supra note 53, at 99-101.
162. Robert H. Lande, Are Antitrust "Treble" Damages Really Single Damages?, 54
OHIO ST. L.J. 115, 115 (1993) ("Everybody 'knows' that antitrust violations lead to
mandatory treble damages and attorneys' fees."). Congress has provided that a private
plaintiff "injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the
antitrust laws may sue ... and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained." 15
U.S.C. § 15(a). Additionally, the plaintiff is entitled to recover "the cost[s[ of [the] suit,
including a reasonable attorney's fee." [d. Some other federal treble damages statutes
include the following: trademark violations, 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (2006); copyright infringement, 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2006); racketeering (RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (2006); failure to
disclose lead-paint hazard, 42 U.S.C. § 4852d (2006); and odometer tampering, 49 U.S.C.
§ 32710 (2006).
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Multiple damages are similar to punitive damages in one basic way:
they both impose additional damages on the defendant for certain kinds
of wrongdoing, in part to deter the defendant and others from that
wrongdoing. 163 However, they are different in several significant ways.
Whereas punitive damages have always been a common-law remedy, 164
multiple damages are entirely statutory. 165 Unlike punitive damages,
which are awarded at the discretion of the jury,166 multiple damages
are often, though not always, mandatory upon a finding that the
defendant has violated the multiple damages statute. 167 Multiple
damages awards that are discretionary are determined by the judge,
rather than the jury.16B Another important difference is that many
courts, including the Supreme Court, have recognized that multiple
damages may serve not only to punish and deter defendants but also to
help compensate plaintiffs. 169

163. Compare, e.g., Am. Soc'y of Mech. Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556,
575-76 (1982) (stating that treble damages are a form of deterrence), with BMW, 517 U.S.
at 568 (explaining that punitive damages serve as a form of deterrence).
164. See Haslip, 499 U.S. at 15-16.
165. 25 C.J.S., Damages § 218 (2010) ("Multiple damages are allowed only when
expressly authorized by statute.").
166. See Haslip, 499 U.S. at 15-16.
167. See infra text accompanying note 250-80. For a discussion of mandatory versus
permissive multiple damage provisions, see infra text accompanying notes 250-80.
168. [d.
169. See, e.g. Hydroleuel Corp., 456 U.S. at 575-76. The Supreme Court has recognized
that in antitrust cases, the purposes of treble damages include punishment, deterrence, and
compensation. [d. at 575. In Hydroleuel Corp., the Supreme Court stated, "[Tlhe antitrust
private action was created primarily as a remedy for the victims of antitrust violations.
Treble damages 'make the remedy meaningful by counter-balancing "the difficulty of
maintaining a private suit"' under the antitrust laws." [d. (citations omitted) (quoting
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477,486 n.l0 (1977». The Court
further stated, "Since treble damages serve as a means of deterring antitrust violations and
of compensating victims, it is in accord with both the purposes of the antitrust laws and
principles of agency law to hold ASME liable for the acts of agents committed with
apparent authority." Id. at 575-76.
In the case of patent infringement, in which federal law provides discretionary treble
damages, one noted commentator stated that "[wlhether the purpose of an increased
damage award should be exemplary ... or compensatory ... is a longstanding controversy
in the law. Perhaps the best view is that increased awards combine both purposes." 7
DONAL S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS: A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF PATENTABILITY,
VALIDITY AND INFRINGEMENT § 20.03(4)(b)(iii) (2010) (footnote omitted).
One state court allowed insurance coverage for treble damages, distinguishing them from
punitive damages in which insurance coverage was not allowed because "the statute
reflects as much a concern for employees' welfare as it does a desire to punish employers."
Wojciak v. N. Package Corp., 310 N.W.2d 675, 680 (Minn. 1981).
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Taking a closer look at the reasons behind the treble damages
provision of the antitrust laws and comparing them to the broader range
of intentional torts that are the subject of this Article is instructive.
Antitrust cases are particularly well suited for treble damages for a
number of reasons, many of which apply to at least some intentional
torts. 170
Since antitrust violations are not only intentional but are usually a
planned and thought-out strategy for financial gain (as opposed to
intentional yet impulsive activity), they are particularly susceptible to
deterrence. Many intentional torts fit this model-for example, fraud,
most unfair business practices, and knowingly failing to fix a dangerous
condition or product. Intentional torts-which may not be thoroughly
planned in advance or may not be undertaken for financial gain, such as
libel or battery-thus would not be as susceptible to deterrence.
Another reason advanced in support of treble damages for antitrust
violations is that these violations often go undetected or take years to
detect.l7l Since defendants would benefit from not paying damages for
undetected violations, single damages are insufficient to provide
optimum deterrence, and treble damages are necessary to account for
undetected violations. 172 Some intentional torts, especially those with
multiple victims, such as toxic torts, are more difficult to detect than
torts directed at a single victim or a small number of victims. 173
The fact that antitrust cases are difficult to prove and expensive to
bring also contributes to the need for multiple damages, as even detected
cases may lead to extended or unsuccessful litigation. 174 Although

170. See Lande, supra note 162, at 173. Robert Lande has argued for the continuation
of treble damages for antitrust violations, stating that "[wlhile some of the factors this
Article has analyzed are relatively unique to antitrust, others are not, including the
adjustments for lack of prejudgment interest, statute of limitations problems, attorneys'
fees, corporate costs for plaintiffs to pursue the case, and costs to the judicial system." Id.
(footnote omitted).
171. See id. at 115, 171 ("Antitrust damage awards should be significantly greater than
the actual damages caused by these violations to account for detection problems, proof
problems, and risk aversion.").
172. See id. at 115-16 & n.l.
173. See id. at 115-16 ("Price fixing and bid rigging, for example, are difficult to detect
and unquestionably anticompetitive. . .. Other antitrust violations, however, including
those associated with large mergers and joint ventures, are relatively simple to detect.").
The fact that not all intentional torts are hard to detect does not fully distinguish them
from antitrust violations. Some types of antitrust cases, such as price fixing, are more
likely to go undetected. Id. Others, such as anti-competitive mergers, are easier to detect.
Id. Yet they all can result in treble damages. Id.
174. See id. at 129-58 (discussing factors that support the need for multiple damages,
including time and success of litigation).
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many intentional torts might not be as difficult to prove, some, such as
toxic torts or fraud, can also be difficult and expensive to bring. Many
intentional torts, however, may be difficult for victims to bring for other
reasons, such as when the low dollar amount of an injury may not make
litigation feasible. Multiple damages in such cases might allow more
potential plaintiffs to bring suit, providing greater deterrence. 175
Treble damages and an award of attorney fees in antitrust suits also
provide additional compensation to plaintiffs to make up for attorney
fees, lack of prejudgment interest, and other litigation costS. 176 The
need for such compensation might be somewhat greater for antitrust
cases than many intentional tort cases because the complexities of
antitrust suits tend to make them particularly long and difficult. 177
However, other kinds of cases such as products liability lawsuits, can
also take years of litigation to resolve. 178
Treble damages in antitrust cases remain controversial with critics
calling for their elimination or restriction, citing the dangers of unfair
overpayment by defendants. 179 Yet one study has shown that in
antitrust cases, "plaintiffs who sue successfully probably receive an
award that is approximately equal to their actual damages," making
them "much closer to single damages than to treble damages.,,18o If

175. Although, if damages are very low, then even trebling them will not make
individual lawsuits more viable. In such situations, an award of attorney fees would be
more effective in facilitating plaintiffs' claims. There will be some cases, however, when
plaintiffs' damages are significant but still do not justify bringing the litigation. In these
cases, trebling the damages might tip the scales.
176. See Lande, supra note 162, at 118 (listing the need for treble damages in antitrust
cases due to "the lack of prejudgment interest[,) plaintiffs' attorneys fees and costs[,) [and)
other costs to plaintiffs pursuing cases").
177. Id. at 130-34. That may be one reason why both treble damages and attorney fees
are awarded to successful antitrust plaintiffs, whereas most extra-compensatory statutes
provide either one or the other but usually not both.
178. See DOBBS, supra note 6, at 969.
179. Edward D. Cavanagh, Detrebling Antitrust Damages: An Idea Whose Time Has
Come?, 61 TuL. L. REV. 777, 779-80, 792-93 (1987); see also Frank H. Easterbrook,
Detrebling Antitrust Damages, 28 J.L. & ECON. 445 (1985).
While the desirability of the mandatory treble damages remedy has been
challenged from time to time since 1890, scholars did not seriously focus on
antitrust remedies until the 1970s. In the last decade, mandatory trebling has
come under intense attack from economists and legal scholars. The debate has
broadened, and the de trebling movement has gathered momentum.
Cavanagh, supra, at 779-80 (footnotes omitted).
180. Lande, supra note 162, at 166.
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that is true, treble damages would be too low to provide proper
deterrence and compensation. 181

IV,

EXTENDING MULTIPLE DAMAGES TO A BROAD RANGE OF
INTENTIONAL TORTS

Of the various ways of providing additional compensation and
deterrence in a broad range of cases involving intentional harm, multiple
damages might be the most reasonable and practicable. Unlike punitive
damages, multiple damages are not subject to the unguided discretion
of juries. 182 This fact reduces both the problem of excessive awards
and the lack of awards in many deserving cases. Juries would merely
have to make a specific factual finding of intent-or in some cases, malice
or knowledge-to bring double or treble damages into effect. In many
cases, such as intentional infliction of emotional distress, fraud, or
battery, this state-of-mind requirement would be inherent in finding the
defendant liable for the tort. In some cases, however, the jury would
have to be asked to make an additional finding. For example, in a
products liability case, the jury would be asked whether the defendant
had knowledge of the dangerous defect in the product, or in a libel case,
the jury would be asked whether the defendant had knowledge of the
falsity of the statement.
That this solution is possible as a practical matter is evidenced by the
fact that multiple damage statutes already exist at both the federal l83
and state levels. l84 These statutes exist not only in antitrust cases but
also in a fairly wide range of tortS. 185 Since there is very little that
has been written about this, many lawyers would probably be surprised
to learn that every state already provides multiple damages for at least
some discreet, intentional tortS. 186 There are, however, wide variations

181. See id. at 118 ("[W)hen viewed correctly, antitrust damages awards are
approximately equal to, or less than, the actual damages caused by antitrust violations.")
182. See infra text accompanying notes 250-80.
183. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (2006); 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (2006).
184. E.g., O.C.G.A. § 16-14-6(c) (2007) (Georgia); N.C. GEN. STAT. 75D-8(c) (2009)
(North Carolina).
185. See infra Part IV.A.
186. See infra note 189. Based on a LexisNexis search performed by the Author, it
appears that the majority of law review articles concerning multiple damages focus on
federal antitrust laws or other federal statutes such as RICO. See, e.g., Cavanagh, supra
note 179; Easterbrook, supra note 179; Lande, supra note 162. In a search on LexisNexis
of twenty-seven law review articles whose titles indicated that they concerned multiple
damages, eighteen were about federal statutes (including eleven antitrust and five RICO
articles), and only seven concerned state statutes.
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from state to state,187 perhaps even wider than other variations of tort
laws. There seems to be little rhyme or reason as to what torts are
covered by each state. There are also huge deficiencies within the laws
of most states in that multiple damages are not available for some torts
that clearly deserve them more than other torts that are covered.

A Review of State Law
Although most attorneys are familiar with the fact that treble
damages are available in federal antitrust suits (and a handful of others,
such as RICO, copyright, and trademark infringement suitS),188 most
would probably be surprised at both the number and breadth of multiple
damages provisions that exist under state law. Every state has at least
a few statutes that provide for multiple damages for particular kinds of
wrongful conduct, and some states have a fairly large number of these
provisions. 189 Perhaps not surprisingly, California has the largest
number of multiple damage statutes at sixty-five, but at least fifteen
states have twenty or more such statutes. \90 All but fifteen states
have at least ten multiple damages provisions. 191 The states vary

A.

187. See infra Part IV.A.
188. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (trademark violations); 17 U.S.C. § 504 (copyright
infringement); 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (RICO).
189. This list represents an approximation of the number of multiple damages actions
for each state. It was obtained by doing a LexisNexis search of all state statutes
containing words such as "double," "treble," "two times," or "three times," along with the
words "compensate," "compensatory," "damage," or "harm," followed by a review of the
index of each state's statutory compilation. It is likely that this methodology may have
missed some statutes; therefore, the search may have resulted in a number for each state
that is lower than the actual number of such statutes. It is not necessary that this survey
result in an accurate number of multiple damages statutes. The survey was designed to
identify the breadth of the use of such statutes, both as to the number and kinds of actions
covered. The point of the survey can be proven even if slightly under-inclusive.
Based on the Author's survey, the minimum number of multiple damages statutes for
each of the fifty states is as follows: Alabama (8); Alaska (5); Arizona (3); Arkansas (3);
California (65); Colorado (21); Connecticut (17); Delaware (14); Florida (12); Georgia (16);
Hawaii (3); Idaho (28); Illinois (28); Indiana (4); Iowa (17); Kansas (8); Kentucky (13);
Louisiana (13); Maine (19); Maryland (19); Massachusetts (32); Michigan (28); Minnesota
(32); Mississippi (12); Missouri (8); Montana (24); Nebraska (4); Nevada (23); New
Hampshire (9); New Jersey (16); New Mexico (10); New York (27); North Carolina (15);
North Dakota (12); Ohio (10); Oklahoma (18); Oregon (20); Pennsylvania (12); Rhode Island
(8); South Carolina (9); South Dakota (9); Tennessee (33); Texas (16); Utah (17); Vermont
(130); Virginia (9); Washington (22); West Virginia (11); Wisconsin (20); Wyoming (4).
190. Id.
191. Id.
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quite widely, not only in the number of wrongful actions covered but also
in their subject matter. 192
Most state multiple damages provisions involve statutorily created
torts, such as racketeering193 or phishing. 194 Several provisions also
create a treble damages remedy for a small, specially targeted sub-class
of what already might have constituted a broader common law tort, such
as specific kinds of fraud 195 or trespass. 196 Very few multiple damages provisions extend the treble damages remedy to the entirety of a
single common-law intentional tort, the only widespread example being
the tort of waste. 197 Although some multiple damages statutes seem

192. See infra text accompanying notes 193-230.
193. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2314 (2010), available at http://www.azleg.state.
az.usIFormatDocument.asp?format=print&inDoc=/ars/13/02314.htm&Title=13&DocType=
ARS (Arizona); O.C.G.A. § 16-14-6 (Georgia); NEV. REV. STAT. § 207.470 (2009), available
at http://www.leg.state.nv.us.INRSINRS-207.html (Nevada); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-42-6
(2010), available at http://www.conwaygreene.com!nmsullpext.dll?f=templates&fn=mainh.htm&2.0 (New Mexico); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75D-8 (North Carolina); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 12.1-06.1-05 (2009), available at http://www.legis.nd.gov/cencodelt121c061.pdf (North
Dakota); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-15-4 (2009), available at http://www.rilin.state.ri.uslStatutes/
TITLE7/7-15/7-15-4.HTM (Rhode Island); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.82.100 (2010), available
at http://apps.leg.wa.gov/rew/default.aspx?cite=9A.82.100 (Washington).
194. E.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 22948.3 (West 2008) (California); 740 ILL. CaMP.
STAT. ANN. 7/15 (West 2010) (Illinois); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:2024 (Supp. 2010)
(Louisiana); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 390-b (McKinney Supp. 2010) (New York); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15, § 776.11 (West Supp. 2009) (Oklahoma); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-5204
(Supp. 2009) (Tennessee).
195. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2734 (2010), available at http://delcode.delaware.
gov/title6/c027/sc04/index.shtml (in Delaware, misleading a consumer in the sale of a
product); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 668.704 (West Supp. 2010) (in Florida, fraudulent use of
another's identity).
196. E.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 539:3 (2009), available at http://www.gencourt.state
.nh.uslrsa/htmlllv/539/539-3.htm (in New Hampshire, willful trespass and leaving open or
damaging any fence or gate); N.Y. PuB. LANDS LAW § 9 (McKinney Supp. 2010) (in New
York, "trespass upon Indian lands").
197. See, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 381.400 (West 2006) (Kentucky); ME. REV. STAT.
tit. 14, § 7505 (2010), available at http://www.mainelegislature.orgllegislstatutes/14/titleI4s
ec7505.html (Maine); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 242, § 4 (2010), available at http://www.malegis
lature.govlLaws/GeneralLawsIPartIIIfl'itleIIlIChapter242/Section4 (Massachusetts); MINN.
STAT. § 561.17 (2010), available at http://www.revisor.mn.gov/statutesl?id=561.17
(Minnesota); Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.420 (2010), available at http://www.moga.mo.gov/statut
eslc500-599/5370000420.htm (Missouri); NEV. REV. STAT. § 40.150 (2009), available at
http://www.leg.state.nv.uslNRSINRS-040.html#NRS040Sec150 (Nevada); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:65-6(West 2000)(NewJersey); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-538 (2009}(NorthCarolina);N.D.
CENT. CODE § 32-17-22 (2009), available at http://www.legis.nd.gov/cencodelt32.html(North
Dakota); OR. REV. STAT. § 105.805 (2009), available at http://www.leg.state.or.uslors/105.
html (Oregon); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-7-1 (2010), available at http://legis.state.sd.us/
statutes/DisplayStatute.aspx?Type=Statute&Statute=21=7=1 (South Dakota); VA. CODE
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to have been passed for political reasons,198 because of the lobbying
efforts of a particular industry,199 or to protect the state treasury,200
most of them seem designed to promote one or both of the two aims
identified in this Article: deterring particularly harmful conduct and
fully compensating tort victims. 201
The sheer number of multiple damages statutes is very large-more
than one thousand overall-and except for a few causes of action passed
by a large number of states, there is little overlap (meaning there are
numerous different actions subject to multiple damages).202 This
shows that state legislators know about and are quite willing to use
multiple damages as an important tool when regulating intentional,
wrongful conduct. However, because many ofthe statutes are so narrow
(for example, a statute imposing penalties for disposing of trash in a
charitable receptacle for clothes)203 and vary so widely, they are not yet
an adequate, over-all solution to the problems discussed in this Article.
Many of the multiple damages statutes fall into one of several
categories: (1) protection of particularly vulnerable victims, such as the
disabled, elderly, or children;204 (2) economic torts such as restraint of
trade,205 unfair business practices,206 racketeering,207 and trade-

ANN. § 55-216 (2007) (Virginia).
198. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 684 (West 2002) (in Oklahoma, receiving a
partial birth abortion).
199. See, e.g., Cow. REV. STAT. § 18-4-702 (2010), available at http://www.michie.com
/Colorado (in Colorado, theft of cable services).
200. See, e.g., CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 6224.2 (West 2001) (in California, converting
minerals owned by the state); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 68.082 (West Supp. 2010) (in Florida,
presenting false claims against the state).
201. See infra notes 204-12.
202. See infra text accompanying notes 203-30.
203. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.91.130 (2010), available at http://apps.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default
.aspx?cite=9.91.130.
204. E.g., W. VA. CODE § 5A-3C-2 (2010), available at http://www.legis.state.wv.us/
WVCODE/ChaperEntire.cfm?chap=OSa&art=3C&section=2#03C (West Virginia).
20S. E.g., ME. REV. STAT. tit. 10, § 1104 (2010), available at http://www.mainelegisla
ture.org/legis/statutes/10/title10sec1104.html (Maine); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93, § 9 (2010),
available at http://www.malegislature.govlLaws?GeneralLawsIPartIffitleXV/Chapter93/
Section9 (Massachusetts); MINN. STAT. § 325D.S7 (2010), available at http://www.revisor.
mn.gov/statutesl?id=325D.57 (Minnesota); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-222 (2009), available
at http://data.opi.mt.gov/billslmca/30/14120-14-222.htm (Montana); UTAH CoDE ANN. § 13-S14 (2010), available at http://le.utah.gov/-codetrITLE13/html13_0S_001400.htm (Utah); VA.
CODE ANN. § S9.1-9.1S (2006) (Virginia); W. VA. CODE § SA-3C-12 (2010), available at
http://www.legis.state.wv.us/WVCODE/ChapterEntire.cfm?chap=05a&art=3C&section
=12#03C (West Virginal.
206. E.g., CAL Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17082 (West 2008); COW. REV. STAT. § 6-2-111
(2010), available at http://www.michie.comlcolorado/lpext.dlllcocode/1/9a3a19a5e/alf.2/a29d
?f=templates&fn=main-h.htm&cp= (Colorado); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-110g (West
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mark infringement;208 (3) a response to new high-tech torts, such as
identity theft,209 phishing,210 and eavesdropping;211 and (4) consumer protection. 212
It is very likely that the seemingly haphazard distribution of these
statutes may be attributed to some random variable, such as how
recently the statute was passed or whether its sponsors thought about
adding treble damages, than to any reluctance to extend the remedy
more broadly. For example, California has more than sixty-five causes
of action subject to multiple damages.213 Some are quite reasonable
and laudable, such as claims of human traffickini 14 and the release

2007) (Connecticut); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:300.13 (2003) (Louisiana).
207. See sources cited supra note 193.
208. E.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-514 (2001) (Tennessee); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-40402 (2010), available at http://le.utah.gov/-codeITITLE13Ihtm/1330_040200.htm (Utah);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-1-112 (2010), available at http://michie.lexisnexis.com/wyoming/lpext
.dll?f=templates&fn=main-h.htm (Wyoming).
209. E.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-8-199 (LexisNexis 2005 & Supp. 2009) (Alabama); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 668.704 (West 2010); O.C.G.A. § 16-9-130 (2007) (Georgia); MO. REV. STAT.
§ 570.223 (2009), available at http://www.moga.mo.gov/statuteslc500-599/5700000223.htm
(Missouri); 42 PA. CON. STAT. ANN. § 8315 (West 2007) (Pennsylvania); TENN. CODE. ANN.
§ 47-18-2104 (2001) (Tennessee).
210. See sources cited supra note 194.
211. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 637.2 (West 2010) (California).
212. E.g., ALA. CODE § 8-19D-2 (2002) (in Alabama, deceptive sweepstakes); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 42-9-113 (2010), available at http://www.michie.com/colorado/lpext.dlJ?f=templates
&fn=main-h.htm&cp= (in Colorado, failure to make promised motor vehicle repairs); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2533 (2010), available at http://delcode.delaware.gov/titie6/c025/sc03/in
dex.shtml (in Delaware, deceptive trade practices); 815 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 50512W
(2008) (in Illinois, deception in radon reduction services); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1409
(2003 & Supp. 2010) (in Louisiana, causing loss by deceptive acts); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 10,
§ 1322 (2010), available at http://www.mainelegislature.org/legislstatutesl10/titie10sec
1322.html (in Maine, violating fair credit reporting laws); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-6
(2010), available at http://www.conwaygreene.com/nmsullpext.dlJ?f=templates&fn=main
h.htm&2.0 (in New Mexico, fraudulent used car sales); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 350-e
(McKinney Supp. 2010) (in New York, any unlawful consumer practice). The most common
consumer protection statutes address odometer tampering. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 14-106b (West 2006) (Connecticut); 625 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 5/3-112.1 (West 2008)
(Illinois); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 266, § 141 (2010), available at http://malegislature.gov/
LawsiGeneraiLaws?PartIVlTitieIlChapter266/Section 141 (Massachusetts); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 407.546 (2009), available at http://www.moga.mo.gov/statuteslc400-499/4070000546.htm
(Missouri); NEV. REV. STAT. § 484D.340 (2009), available at http://www.leg.state.nv.usl
NRSINRS-484D.html (Nevada); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-348 (2009) (North Carolina); VA.
CODE ANN. § 46.2-112 (2010) (Virginia).
213. See infra notes 214-17. For an explanation and analysis of how the Author
determined the number of multiple damages statutes in California, see supra note 189.
214. CAL. CIV. CODE § 52.5 (West 2007).
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of hazardous substances,215 whereas others seem more trivial, such as
a claim against a dating service for failure to inform customers of their
right to cancel. 216 It is clear that the California legislature is willing
and able to apply multiple damages to a large array of wrongful
behavior.
California allows multiple damages, however, for vandalism at a
construction site but not for other acts of vandalism.217 It does not
make sense not to cover other acts of vandalism-such as vandalism of
a school-or even all acts of vandalism. The decision to include vandalism only at a construction site was most likely not a conscious decision
to exclude others but merely a positive response to a specific request in
a specific bill. One would guess that if someone were to champion a
multiple damages remedy for school vandalism, it would have a good
chance of passage. Based on the Author's research, it does not appear
that any state has done a systematic review of state tort law for the
purpose of determining in which causes of action multiple damages
should be allowed. Clearly, however, many state legislatures are
amenable to allowing multiple damages in a large number of circumstances to protect citizens from harmful conduct. 218
Approximately half of state multiple damages statutes are mandatory,219 meaning that treble damages must be awarded if the tort is
committed220 or if the tort is committed with a particular state of
mind-knowingly,221 intentionally,222 willfully,223 or maliciously.224

215. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25359 (West 2006).
216. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1694.4 (West Supp. 2010).
217. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1721 (West 2009).
218. See sources cited supra notes 204-12.
219. See infra notes 225-27.
220. Many of the statutes that provide for mandatory multiple damages do not provide
any specific state-of-mind requirement, such as the statutes addressing racketeering and
identity theft. See sources cited supra notes 193, 209. With a large number of these
statutes, the tort in question would clearly require a fmding of at least intent, and
therefore, no additional state-of-mind requirement in the statute is required. See sources
cited supra note 193 (racketeering), 209 (identity theft); see also CONN. GEN STAT. ANN.
§ 51-247a (West Supp. 2010) (in Connecticut, discharging or threatening to discharge an
employee for serving on a jury). However, there are some statutes that provide for
mandatory multiple damages but do not contain a state-of-mind requirement and could
theoretically require multiple damages upon a showing of mere negligence. E.g., IND. CODE
§ 6-1.1-35-11 (2010), available at http://www.in.govnegislative/idcode/title6/ar1.lIch35.html
(in Indiana, unauthorized disclosure of confidential taxpayer information); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 61.8745 (West 2006) (in Kentucky, failure to follow standards regarding public
records).
221. E.g., ALA. CODE §§ 6-5-601 to -602 (LexisNexis 2005) (Alabama); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
§ 3-1307 (2010), available at http://www.azleg.gov/FormatDocument.asp?inDoc=ars/3/01307
.htm&Title=3&DocType=ARS (Arizona); COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-66-103 (2010), available
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The language used in these statutes includes the following: the
defendant "shall be liable,"225 the court "shall award,"226 the plaintiff
"shall be entitled to,"227 or the plaintiff "is entitled to.,,228 Many
other statutes, however, make the award of multiple damages subject to
the judge's discretion, using language that includes the following: "the
court may,,229 or "damages that the court allows.,,23o Most of these
statutes provide no guidance for how the discretion should be exercised,
but presumably it would be based on the equities of the situation,
including the wrongfulness and intentionality of the defendant's
behavior.
Although taken as a whole across all states, the statutes cover a large
number of intentional, wrongful acts, in no single state are these
statutes broad enough to cover a significant percentage of all intentional
torts. Even in states that have a relatively large number of multiple
damages statutes, the statutes are mostly narrow and connected only to

at http://www.michie.com/coloradoflpext.dll?f=templates&fn=main-h.htm&cp= (Colorado);
CONN. GEN STAT. ANN. § 53a-129a (West Supp. 2010) (Connecticut); W. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 59-3-7 (2005) (West Virginia); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 36-1-112 (2010), available at
http://michie.lexisnexis.com/wyoming/lpext.dlllwycode/1b29flb2a5/1b302?f=templates&
fn+main-htm (Wyoming).
222. E.g., O.C.G.A. § 10-1-399 (Georgia); 625 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 5/3-112.1 (Illinois);
WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.630 (2010), available at http://apps.leg.wa.gov/rew/default.aspx?
cite=4.24.630 (Washington).
223. E:g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-566 (2005) (Connecticut); IOWA CODE § 327D.16
(2009), available at http://www.legis.state.ia.uslIowaLaw.html (Iowa); WIS. STAT. § 293.89
(2010), available at http:tnegis.wisconsin.gov/statuteslStat0293.pdf(Wisconsin).
224. E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 160, § 225 (2010), available at http://www.malegisla
ture.govlLawslGeneralLaw/PartItritleXXIliChapter 160/Section225 (Massachusetts); WASH.
REV. CODE § 19.122.070, available at http://upps.leg.wa.gov/rew/defaultlaspx?cite=19.
122.070 (in Washington, willfully or maliciously); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 37-7-4 (LexisNexis
2005) (in West Virginia, willfully or maliciously).
225. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE 1057.3 (West 2007) (California); COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-47.1527 (2010), available at http://www.michie.com/colorado/lpext.dll?f=templates&fn=
mainh.htm&cp= (Colorado); MISS. CODE ANN. § 77-9-321 (2009) (Mississippi); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 34:8A-10.1 (West 2000) (New Jersey).
226. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1695.7 (West Supp. 2010) (California); WIS. STAT. § 26.09
(2010) http:tnegis.wisconsin.gov/statuteslStat0026.pdf (Wisconsin).
227. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.0425 (West 2005) (Florida).
228. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1716 (West 2009) (California).
229. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 68.082 (Florida); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-507.Hb)
(2010), available at http://www.michie.com/maryland/1pext.d111mdcode/1a524/1a567/
1a682?fn=document ("may issue") (Maryland); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 103.96 (2010) available
at http:tnegis.wisconsin.gov/statuteslStat0103.pdf (Wisconsin).
230. E.g., MD. CODE ANN., Bus. REG. § 6-509 (2010), available at http://www.michie.
comlmaryland/1pext.d111mdcode/2dc1l32ab/3359/3382?fn=document-fn (Maryland).
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statutory, rather than common-law, torts,231 which makes them less
than effective at remedying the problems identified in this Article. The
sheer number and breadth of multiple damages statutes, however, is an
indication that a broader statutory application of treble damages might
be a reasonable, feasible, and attainable solution. The next section
discusses what such a statutory scheme might look like.

B.

Blueprint for Awarding Treble Damages for Intentional Torts

There are several issues that must be addressed in fashioning a
system of awarding treble damages in intentional tort cases. Most
importantly, should treble damages be (1) routinely awarded for all
intentional torts, (2) awarded only in certain broad categories of torts,
or (3) awarded only for specified, individual torts? Additionally, once the
torts to be covered are determined, should the award be mandatory or
discretionary?
1. What Torts Should be Covered? Since most tort victims are
under-compensated by compensatory damages, and most intentional
tortfeasors are under-deterred,232 a state would be justified in applying
treble damages to all intentionally committed torts. If not already
required by the elements of the tort itself, the normal state-of-mind
requirement to award treble damages would be "intentionally" or
"willfully." The statute, or the courts in interpreting the statute, could
apply different standards of intent in different situations when desirable.
For example, with some torts, such as trespass or battery, the intent
required should probably be the intent to harm, as opposed to the intent
merely to trespass or the intent to touch required by the basic elements
of the respective torts. For others, such as manufacturing an unreasonably dangerous product, "knowledge" of the dangerousness might be
sufficient. A higher standard could be made applicable to some torts.
Libel or slander, for example, could require a "malicious" state of mind
to counter First Amendmene33 concerns. Alternatively, states could
decide to exempt these torts from treble damages in order to prevent the
chilling of protected speech.234

231. See supra text accompanying notes 193-94.
232. See supra Part II.A-B.
233. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
234. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). In Gertz the Supreme Court
held that states did not have to require libel plaintiffs who were not public figures to meet
the more demanding "actual malice" standard of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254 (1964), and could recover actual damages under a negligence standard. 418 U.S. at
342-43, 350. However, the Court held that punitive damages could not be awarded upon
any lesser fmding than the actual malice standard:
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Care should be taken to distinguish breach of contract cases from
similar intentional torts. In a breach of contract case, treble damages
should not normally be awarded even though the defendant's intentional
conduct has injured the plaintiff. For example, an insurance company
that has a valid reason to deny coverage would be guilty only of breach
of contract and subject to single damages if it were later determined
through litigation that they were bound by the contract to pay the claim.
If, however, the insurance company wrongfully and intentionally refused
to honor a policy without a valid reason, it would be guilty of an
intentional tort and subject to treble damages. 235
Subjecting all intentional torts to treble damages might be too radical
an approach for most states to take. A more modest-but still very
broad-approach would be to authorize treble damages in certain
categories of cases. The most likely candidates for such treatment are
discussed below.
First, one such category includes instances in which the defendant's
conduct was not only intentional and wrongful but also in violation of

[PI unitive damages are wholly irrelevant to the state interest that justifies a
negligence standard for private defamation actions. They are not compensation for
injury. Instead, they are private fines levied by civil juries to punish reprehensible
conduct and to deter its future occurrence. In short, the private defamation
plaintiff who establishes liability under a less demanding standard than that
stated by New York Times may recover only such damages as are sufficient to
compensate him for actual injury.
Id. at 350. It is unclear whether the constitutional requirement of actual malice would
apply to multiple damages, which have both a compensatory and deterrent purpose, given
that the Supreme Court took a broad view of "actual injury." In any case, whether
constitutionally required or not, if any state decides to provide multiple damages for libel,
it should-and almost certainly would-require at least an intentional, if not malicious,
state-of-mind standard.
235. See Stevenson v. Louis Dreyfus Corp., 811 P.2d 1308 (N.M. 1991). In Stevenson
the New Mexico Unfair Trade Practices Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 57-12-1 to -26 (2010),
available at http://www.conwaygreene.comlnmsuJIpext.dll?=templates&fn=main-h.htm&2.0,
made "faiUurel to deliver the quality or quantity of goods or services contracted for" a
violation subject to treble damages. Stevenson, 811 P.2d at 1310 (internal quotation marks
omitted). The New Mexico Supreme Court sensibly read into the statute a requirement
that the defendant must have known at the time it contracted that it could not supply
what was contracted for. Id. The court recognized that failure to do so "would result in
every breach of contract case being a violation of the Act." Id.; see also Barry Perlstein,
Crossing the Contract-Tort Boundary: An Economic Argument for the Imposition of
Extracompensatory Damages for Opportunistic Breach of Contract, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 877
(1992) (footnote omitted) ("The common law has traditionally maintained a rigid doctrinal
division between two of its subdivsions-tort and contract. Today, courts are increasingly
willing to cross the doctrinal demarcation between tort and contract by allowing tort
damages for bad faith breaches of contract."),
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state criminal laws. 236 If the state has already decided that the
activity deserved punishment and should be deterred, then this would
seem to be an ideal situation for adjusting the equities to make sure the
plaintiff receives full compensation, even if this means burdening the
defendant. It could be argued that adding extra damages to the existing
criminal sanction might result in double punishment or over-deterrence.
There is certainly some possibility of this, but it is more likely that the
criminal may go unpunished,237 meaning that neither the compensatory nor deterrent function will be adequately filled.
A second category includes torts involving misuse of power for
economic gain, such as antitrust violations and unfair business practices.
These types of misconduct usually involve calculation on the part of the
wrongdoer that the rewards of the misconduct should exceed any
possible legal liability; therefore, it makes sense to the wrongdoer, at
least from a purely economic standpoint, to engage in the misconduct.
Subjecting the activity to treble damages should change the equation
sufficiently in many situations so that the misconduct no longer appears
to be advantageous economically.
A third category involves any tortious behavior directed at consumers
that is grounded in fraud or deceit. The fourth category includes cases
involving the willful refusal to make a required payment or refund to
consumers, tenants, employees, or insureds without cause or for
improper purposes.
Lastly, the final category encompasses any wrongful act taken for the
purpose of causing bodily injury or with the knowledge that bodily injury
was likely to occur. This category would cover common-law torts such
as battery and more modern products liability claims that involve a
manufacturer who knows-or perhaps clearly should have known-of the
danger of harm.
With most of the existing multiple damage provisions under state law,
the multiple damages remedy was not applied to some existing causes
of action. Rather, at the time the substantive statutory remedy was
created, the decision was made to include the enhanced remedy. Since

236. E.g., MINN. STAT. §§ 609.52 to .53, available at http://www.revisor.mn.gov/statutesl
(in Minnesota, concealing stolen property); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-17-1 (in Mississippi,
arson); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202-A:24 (2009), available at http://www.state.nh.uslrsal
htmllXVIl202-N202-A-24.htm (in New Hampshire, defacing or destroying any property);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-13-181 (2003) (in South Carolina, possessing stolen goods); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-6-412 (2010), available at http://le.utah.gov/-codetrITLE76Ihtml
76_06_041200.htm (in Utah, theft of property).
237. This may be due to overburdened prosecutors who must concentrate on only the
most serious cases. The difficult standard of proof and rules in criminal cases also make
it harder to convict.
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none of the more widespread approaches above (all categories of
intentional torts) are likely to be adopted by a large number of states in
the near future, authorizing an enhanced remedy at the time the
statutory remedy is created might be the most viable practical approach
at this time. Any time a state legislature is considering creating a
private statutory damages remedy to redress intentional wrongful action,
the legislature should seriously consider awarding multiple damages to
a prevailing plaintiff. Given the arguments presented in this Article,
multiple damages in such situations should be the norm. Those
opposing multiple damages would have the burden of showing why it
would be unfair in that particUlar situation to award more than
compensatory damages.
Legislatures should also be encouraged to revisit some specific,
existing causes of action to determine whether multiple damages are
appropriate. The most obvious candidates for such treatment would be
statutory torts for which some, but not all, states already provide
multiple damages, such as unfair trade practices. 238 A state could also,
however, examine all relevant causes of action-those involving wrongful,
intentional action in both statutory and common law-to determine which
would be suitable for awarding multiple damages.
There are some arguments against imposing multiple damages for
intentional torts. Obviously, anyone who disagreed with the basic
premise of this Article-that intentional tort victims are often undercompensated and that defendants are sometimes under-deterred-would
be opposed to multiple damages. However, there are additional
arguments that might be raised by someone willing to accept this basic
premise but who might not believe multiple damages are the best or
even an appropriate remedy.239
First, the possibility of increased damages might provide an incentive
to plaintiffs to bring more frivolous lawsuits. This, of course, could also
be said of any extra-compensatory remedies, such as punitive damages
and attorney fees. The answer to frivolous lawsuits, however, is not to
deny an otherwise reasonable remedy to deserving victims. There are
other ways of discouraging frivolous litigation, such as the common-law
tort of malicious prosecution,240 sanctions under civil procedure rules

238. See sources cited supra note 205.
239. This could be because these individuals believe an alternative remedy, such as
punitive damages or attorney fees, might be better. It could also be that, although they
accept the basic premise, they believe that any additional remedy would end up creating
more problems than it could solve.
240. 52 AM. JUR. 2D Malicious Prosecution § 8 (2008) (defming malicious prosecution
as "the institution or continuation of original judicial proceedings" with "malice" and "lack
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such as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11,241 or a heightened pleading
standard. 242
Subjecting a defendant to the possibility of higher damages might also
present an added incentive to the defendant to litigate more vigorously,
thereby increasing litigation costs. It could, however, decrease litigation
by encouraging defendants who are in the wrong to settle for an amount
closer to the actual damages to avoid the possible imposition of multiple
damages. One could also argue that choosing an arbitrary multiplier of
two or three might over-compensate some plaintiffs whose litigation
costs are low or over-deter some defendants. It would not be practicable,
however, to try to measure the actual cost to plaintiffs in each individual
case; measuring would only lead to more litigation. Doubling or trebling
damages is, of course, a generalized estimate of the appropriate amount
of the award. However, these are not numbers plucked out of thin air;
they have been the two historic measures of multiple damages.
One recommendation would be to provide for mandatory double
damages, along with discretionary treble damages. 243 The double
damages would be mostly to compensate plaintiffs for the cost and
trouble of litigation. This provision would probably not over-compensate-and would never grossly over-compensate-the plaintiff, such as
with some punitive damages awards in the past. The court could then
use its discretion, based on the wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct,
to increase the award from two to three times the compensatory
damages. This would give the court the flexibility to provide an
appropriate amount of deterrence. Trebling the damages might
unintentionally over-compensate the plaintiff in some cases. However,
if trebling was done not for compensatory purposes but to deter
particularly wrongful conduct, it would still be justified.
Finally, the same fairness argument that was made earlier in relation
to expanding the use of one-way attorney fees statutes244 must be

of probable cause").
241. FED. R. CN. P. 11. Rule 11(b) requires the attorney or party bringing a claim to
certify that the claim is "warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for
extending, modifying, or reversing existing law" and that "the factual contentions have
evidentiary support." Further, Rule 11(c) provides for monetary sanctions for certain
violations.
242. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544 (2007). In Twombly and Iqbal, the Supreme Court tightened up the very
liberal pleading standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 by requiring the plaintiff to
show that the claim was "plausible" and not merely "possible." Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949;
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
243. See infra text accompanying notes 279-80.
244. See supra text accompanying notes 147-53.
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examined to see if it also applies to treble damages statutes. The
argument is that the use of one-way attorney fees statutes is justified
when plaintiffs act as "private attorneys general" by furthering
important governmental interests. However, statutes that regularly
award fees to prevailing plaintiffs but not prevailing defendants could
be viewed as unfair and unequal treatment if extended to all or most
intentional tort cases.
These two remedies have in common the fact that they favor the party
seeking and obtaining redress, which is almost always the plaintiff,245
over the party defending the claim, even if it turns out that the
defending party prevails. But this disparity exists with every tort
remedy, including the normal compensatory damages, which have never
been considered unfair on the grounds that they are one-sided. Any
enhanced damages will favor plaintiffs because damages in general favor
plaintiffs. Although punitive damages have been criticized as unfair,246 this criticism has never been made on the grounds that punitive damages are awarded only to plaintiffs and not defendants.
The awarding of substantive damages to plaintiffs but not defendants
(even those who prevail) results from the fact that defendants do not
suffer substantive damages. Any harm defendants suffer flows only
from defending the lawsuit, and therein lies an important difference
between awarding attorney fees versus awarding multiple damages. An
award of attorney fees could be extended to prevailing defendants but
generally is not because doing so would over-deter deserving tort
plaintiffs from filing suit for fear of financial ruin if they lost. 247
Favoring only plaintiffs with a remedy that could also be applied to
defendants would seem to require an important governmental interest
in facilitating the bringing of such lawsuits. As with any damages,
however, enhanced substantive damages-punitive or multiple-are by
definition one-way in that they can be awarded only against the
tortfeasor. Therefore, enhanced substantive damages statutes require
that they be justified by the tort principles of compensation and

245. See supra text accompanying notes 142-46. Under most attorney fees statutes (or
at least their interpretation by the courts), fees are routinely awarded only to plaintiffs.
[d. In the case of intentional torts, defendants as well as plaintiffs might sometimes bring
such claims. If they do so successfully, they should be treated equally for the purpose of
receiving multiple damages. To simplify the discussion, this section will refer to plaintiffs
and defendants as a short hand for the claimant and the party defending the claim.
246. See supra text accompanying notes 91-92. It was the unfettered discretion given
to juries, which sometimes resulted in excessive awards, that was held so unfair as to
violate due process.
247. See supra text accompanying note 126.
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deterrence, but they do not require a further justification for treating
plaintiffs and defendants unequally. 248
There are some other differences between attorney fees awards and
multiple damages that make the latter better suited for application to
a broader range of intentional torts. The amount ofa multiple damages
award bears a relationship to the harm caused by the defendant,
whereas the amount of an attorney fees award is based on the length of
the litigation. Although three times the amount of damages caused may
not always be the exact amount required for optimal deterrence, it is
certainly a closer measure than the costs of litigating.
Both remedies have the effect of (1) facilitating the bringing of the
lawsuit, (2) providing additional compensation to successful plaintiffs,
and (3) deterring undesirable conduct by defendants. 249 Although this
statement may be subject to debate, attorney fees statutes seem better
suited to facilitate lawsuits, deter wrongdoers, and compensate victims,
in that order. Multiple damages, on the other hand, are better suited to
compensate, to deter, and to facilitate lawsuits, in that order.
Awarding attorney fees will almost always encourage litigation of valid
claims, regardless of the amount of damages, which makes them ideal
when the government wants to encourage certain claims. However,
trebling damages in cases in which the damages are quite small will
have little effect: a plaintiff who cannot find an attorney to bring a suit
for one thousand dollars probably will not be able to find one to bring a
suit for three thousand dollars. Ifthe primary goal oftreble damages is
to more fully compensate injured plaintiffs, the fact that no benefits flow
to plaintiffs whose damages are so small that they are not worth
bringing suit over even if trebled, is not as bothersome as leaving more
seriously injured plaintiffs without a remedy. Multiple damages will
help fully compensate those who have suffered great loss. These damages
should also help others with damages that are significant but not quite
at the level that would be necessary for an economically viable suit. If
multiple damages accomplish that, they will remedy those cases in
which the unfairness of the compensatory damages system is greatest.
Individuals with very small amounts of damages will not be helped, but
in those cases remedying the un-redressed harm to each individual is,
in itself, not cause enough to encourage a lawsuit. Some other govern-

248. The justification of the need for some remedy to rectify under-compensation and
under-deterrence in most intentional tort cases was made in Part II of this Article. See
supra Part II.A-B. Any reader unconvinced by that argument would not favor either
attorney fees or multiple damages in most intentional tort cases. This argument only goes
to which remedy might be better suited for application to a broad range of intentional torts.
249. See supra Part III.B-C.
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mental purpose or a very strong desire to deter the defendant's conduct
would be needed, and the better remedy in either case would be allowing
attorney fees or facilitating class actions.

2. Mandatory v. Discretionary Awards There is great variation
among states, and even among statutes in the same state, on whether
treble damages should be mandatory or awarded at the judge's
discretion. There is also great variation in how the statutes are worded,
leading to confusion and litigation over whether some statutes were
meant to be discretionary or mandatory. For example, in just one state,
California, the following language has been used to indicate mandatory
multiple damages: (1) "is entitled to,,,250 (2) "shall be subject to,,,251
(3) "the measure of damages is,,,252 (4) "UJudgment shall be entered
for,,,253 (5) "shall be liable,,,254 and (6) "is liable.,,255 The following
language has been used to indicate discretionary awards: (1) the court
"may impose,,,256 (2) a plaintiff "may recover,,,257 (3) "may be entered
for three times the amount,,,258 (4) "may be up to three times,,,259 (5)
"may ... award,,,260 and (6) "may be awarded.,,261
There is at least one wording used in some statutes in several states
that is patently unclear in this regard and should not be used. A statute
that read "Plaintiff may bring an action for three times the damages,,262 could imply either that the choice is up to the plaintiff as to
whether to bring a treble damages action or that it is discretionary with
the court as to whether to award the extra damages. One Massachusetts

250. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1716 (West 2009).
251. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1950.8 (West 2010).
252. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3346 (West 1997).
253. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1812.123 (West 2009).
254. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1057.3 (West 2007).
255. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1054 (West 2003).
256. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3345 (West 1997).
257. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1882.2 (West 2010).
258. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1812.94 (West 2009).
259. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1789.35 (West 2009).
260. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1721 (West 2009).
261. CAL. CIV. CODE § 52.5 (West 2007).
262. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw § 11-1001(d) (2010), available at http://www.
michie.comlmaryland/1pext.d11lmdcode/4572/51c5/5388/5389?fn=document (in Maryland,
"Imlay sue and recover three times the amount of damages"); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149,
§ 150 (20 10), available at http://www.malegislature.govlLawslGeneralLawslPartIlI'itleXXII
Chapter149/Section150 (in Massachuesetts, "may ... institute and prosecute"); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 11-7-165 (Supp. 2009) (in Mississippi, "right to bring cause of action ... to seek");
WIS. STAT. § 100.31 (2010), available at http:tnegis.wisconsin.gov/statuteslStatOlOO.pdf(in
Wisconsin, "may bring an action ... to recover").
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court faced with this kind of imprecise language held that the award of
treble damages was meant to be discretionary:
Any employee claiming to be aggrieved by a violation of section 148 ...
may ... institute and prosecute in his own name ... a civil action for
injunctive relief and any damages incurred, including treble damages
for any loss of wages and other benefits. An employee so aggrieved and
who prevails in such an action shall be entitled to an award of the
costs of litigation and reasonable attorney's fees. 263
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts determined that the
"use of 'shall ['] required the judge to award the plaintiff attorney's
fees.,,264 However, there is nothing in the plain language of the statute
that requires an award of treble damages. 265 The text of the statute
states only that a plaintiff "may" institute a suit for damages that
includes a request for treble damages. 266 Thus, it is by no means
certain that the court was correct. A court would never interpret a
statute that read "a plaintiff may institute an action for compensatory
damages" as giving the court discretion to deny compensatory damages
if the defendant were held liable. In fact, in the Massachusetts statute
interpreted by the court, exactly the same language was used in the
same sentence for compensatory and treble damages,267 yet the court
held that only the treble damages were discretionary. 268
Some courts have even interpreted language that was clearly
mandatory as being discretionary if the magic "shall" word was absent.
The New York landlord-tenant statute provided that if a tenant was
ejected in an unlawful manner, ''he is entitled to recover treble damages
in an action therefore against the wrong-doer.,,269 The New York
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, however, referred to this as
"ambiguous language" and held that treble damages were discretionary.270 There is an indication that the court was less concerned with

263. Wiedmann v. Bradford Group, Inc., 831 N.E.2d 304, 312 (Mass. 2005).
264. Id. at 312 n.13.
265. See MASS ANN. LAWS ch. 149, § 150 (LexisNexis 2006).
266. Id.
267. See id.
268. Wiedmann, 831 N.E.2d at 313.
269. N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 853 (McKinney 2009).
If a person is disseized, ejected, or put out of real property in a forcible or
unlawful manner, or, after he has been put out, is held and kept out by force or
by putting him in fear of personal violence or by unlawful means, he is entitled
to recover treble damages in an action therefore against the wrong-doer.
Id.
270. Lyke v. Anderson, 541 N.Y.S.2d 817, 823 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989). This holding,
although perhaps based on a strained reading of the statutory language, is in accord with
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the language than with the harsh result of holding that treble damages
were mandatory for all wrongful convictions. To establish liability for
wrongful eviction, the tenant need only show the eviction was "by
unlawful means."271 The court was concerned that there could be cases
in which the means of eviction were unlawful, but unintentionally so,
and that it would be unfair to award treble damages. 272
Legislatures can clearly distinguish whether the award is meant to be
mandatory or discretionary by using the simple language "the court shall
award damages of three times" or "the court may award up to three
times." The real question is not linguistic but substantive: should
statutes providing for treble damages be discretionary or mandatory?
Is it unfair to defendants, at least in some cases, to provide for
mandatory treble damages? The answer will depend on several factors,
including (1) the breadth ofthe statute providing for multiple damages
and (2) the state-of-mind requirements for multiple damages.
Most statutes that allow discretionary awards of multiple damages
give no guidance to the trial judge on how to exercise that discretion,
even if the statutes do not contain a specific state-of-mind requirement. 273 Appellate courts, even those within the same state, have used
different standards to make this determination. One Massachusetts
court stated that "treble damages are punitive in nature, allowed only
where authorized by statute, and appropriate where conduct is
'outrageous, because of the defendant's evil motive or his reckless
indifference to the rights of others.",274 Unless explicitly stated in the
statute, such a high standard should not be imposed. It is wrong to
assume that if a legislature provided for multiple damages and did not
include a state-of-mind requirement, that legislature would want the
award reserved for cases of "outrageous" conduct with "evil motive." The
legislature would know that such conduct could already have led to

the policy advanced in this Article that only knowing or intentional harms should be
subject to multiple damages. See id. When faced with a statute that appeared to require
mandatory multiple damages for even unintentional violations, the court chose to interpret
the statute more reasonably, even in the face of relatively clear language. See id.
271. N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 853.
272. Lyke, 541 N.Y. S.2d at 823. As the court stated
The Legislature may very well have intended that the Trial Judge should have
discretion as to the imposition of the drastic remedy of treble damages. We can
envision cases where a tenant is dispossessed by "unlawful means" which are
unintentional ... in which the tenant may not be "entitled" to treble damages.
Id. (citation omitted).
273. See supra text accompanying notes 229-30.
274. Wiedmann, 831 N.E. 2d at 313 (quoting {}Qodrow v. Lane Bryant, Inc., 732 N.E.2d
289, 299 (Mass. 2000».
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punitive damages, and unless the legislature thought it was changing
the decision-maker for extra damages from the jury to the judge, it
probably intended a lesser standard. In a different Massachusetts case,
however, the court held that when the statute was silent as to the
required state-of-mind, the lesser showing of "willful indifference" was
sufficient to trigger multiple damages, and outrageous conduct or evil
motive was not required. 275
There is, however, a preferable way of distinguishing between
intentional and unintentional violations without having a statute
containing no state-of-mind requirement and leaving the decision to the
judge. The question of whether a party acted with intent or not is a
question of fact and should normally be decided by the jury (unless the
case is being tried before a judge). Ideally, statutes providing for
multiple damages should always contain an appropriate state-of-mind
requirement, and the jury should always be instructed about this
requirement. In cases in which the same state-of-mind requirement
exists for both general liability and treble damages, no separate finding
would be required. In cases in which basic liability can be established
without such a finding (as in the New York statute for unlawful
eviction),276 a separate finding of intent, or whatever the appropriate
state-of-mind requirement is, should be required of the jury to award
multiple damages.
The central thesis of this Article is that most, if not all, intentional
tortious injuries should result in the imposition of multiple damages.
Additionally, this Article argues in favor of mandatory damages and
against discretionary damages in most cases. It certainly rules out
giving the judge unfettered discretion or a discretionary system that
places a high burden of proof on the plaintiff. As long as the appropriate
state-of-mind requirement is imposed, there should normally be, at the
very least, a presumption of multiple damages for any designated
intentional tort.
The real question, therefore, is whether the imposition of multiple
damages should be entirely mandatory or whether the judge should
retain some discretion to relieve a defendant of this obligation in some

275. Parow v. Howard, No. 021403A, 2003 WI.. 23163114, at *4 (Mass. Super. Ct. Nov.
12, 2003). In Howard the court was interpreting a statute that provided treble damages
if an employer withheld an employee's wages. [d. Rather than deciding whether the
statute was discretionary or mandatory, the court held the issue irrelevant because "even
if discretionary, treble damages are warranted. Although the actions of the Defendants
cannot be described as outrageous and stemming from an evil motive, their actions were
willfully indifferent to the Plaintiffs' rights." [d.
276. See supra text accompanying notes 270-72.
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cases. The need for such discretion may depend on how broadly a
particular state imposes multiple damages. In states that adopt a
narrowly tailored approach of selectively choosing specific conduct (for
example, the intentional and unlawful withholding of wages), there may
be no need for such discretion. If the legislature determines that
certain, specific actions taken with a specific state-of-mind are deserving
of multiple damages, then it would be unlikely that a defendant in
violation could show that the situation was unusual enough to allow that
defendant to be exempted from multiple damages.
If a state adopts a much broader approach, applying multiple damages
to all intentional wrongs or to very broad categories of such wrongs, the
chances increase that there might be situations, unanticipated by the
legislature, when the equities would not call for saddling the defendant
with multiple damages. For example, in a state where consent is not a
defense to battery, if the plaintiff and the defendant voluntarily engage
in a fight, and only the plaintiff is injured, the defendant might be held
liable for the plaintiff's injuries for having committed battery. In such
a case, however, if the plaintiff has also engaged in the same wrongful
behavior, the plaintiff might not deserve to receive multiple damages,
and the court should have discretion not to award them.
One answer might be to include the kind of language that the courts
have overlaid on the neutrally worded federal Civil Rights Attorney's
Fees Awards Act of 1976. 277 The Supreme Court has determined that
under the statute, prevailing plaintiffs should normally receive a fee
award "unless special circumstances would render such an award
unjust.'>278 If the burden of persuasion were placed on the defendants,
and ifthe courts did not allow the exception to swallow up the rule, such
a provision would be reasonable.
Several states have taken a novel approach that combines both a
mandatory and discretionary award. For example, in California the
illegal cutting of timber results in a mandatory doubling of damages
with discretionary trebling available if the cutting is willfu1. 279
Massachusetts provides compensatory damages for all violations of the
state age discrimination in employment act, including mandatory double
damages for knowing violations of the statute and discretionary treble
damages depending on the wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct. 280

277. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2006).
278. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 418 (1978) (quoting EEOC
v. Christiansburg Garment Co., 550 F.2d 949, 953 (4th Cir. 1977)).
279. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3346 (West 1997).
280. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 9 (2010), available at http:www.malegislature.gov
lLawslGeneralLawsIPartItritleXXIlChapter151B/Section9. The law provides,
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This approach is in line with the thesis of this Article: multiple
damages serve the dual purposes of fully compensating plaintiffs and
sufficiently deterring defendants. As long as the defendant's conduct
meets the minimum state-of-mind requirement to make the imposition
of multiple damages appropriate, doubling the damages should provide
full compensation to the plaintiff. If the defendant's conduct was
sufficiently wrongful to warrant deterrence, the court could award
additional compensation if it were deemed necessary to deter such
conduct.

v.

CONCLUSION

In many cases of intentional tortious conduct, an award of compensatory damages to a prevailing tort plaintiff neither fully compensates the
plaintiff nor adequately deters the defendant and others from similar
conduct. Punitive damages may be available to deter truly outrageous
conduct in some cases, but these damages have little effect on intentional wrongdoing of a less malicious nature. Difficulties in obtaining
punitive damages, coupled with recent statutory and constitutional
restrictions, have rendered this remedy less and less effective. Statutory
attorney fees awarded to prevailing plaintiffs have been useful in
facilitating litigation by plaintiffs who might not otherwise be able to
bring suit and more fully compensating plaintiffs if they are successful.
Attorney fees statutes have most commonly been used to encourage suits
that further important government interests in areas such as civil rights,
consumer and environmental protection, and antitrust. These statutes
may not be suitable for use in a broader range of private litigation in
which such important government interests are not involved.
An award of multiple damages-double or treble-to prevailing plaintiffs
may be the best available remedy to fully compensate victims and more
effectively deter a broad range of intentional and wrongful behavior. All
states currently allow multiple damages in at least some cases, and
many states allow them in a crazy quilt pattern of numerous discreet,
narrowly drawn statutes. State legislatures should conduct a comprehensive examination of the use of multiple damages with an eye toward
making them available in more cases. Most cases involving malicious,
intentional, or extremely reckless wrongdoing that results in harm to a

If the court fmds for the petitioner, recovery shall be in the amount of actual
damages; or up to three, but not less than two, times such amount if the court
finds that the act or practice complained of was committed with knowledge, or
reason to know, that such act or practice violated the provisions of said section
four.

Id.
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blameless victim should be considered candidates for at least double, and
possibly treble, damages. States could do this by allowing multiple
damages in all cases of intentional conduct and perhaps carving out
some exceptions or giving judges the discretion to deny these damages
in exceptional cases when their imposition would result in unfairness to
the defendant. Alternatively, states could identify broad categories of
wrongful behavior that would normally result in multiple damages. A
less effective but possibly more politically realistic alternative would be
to extend the remedy to many more discreet wrongs. Many multiple
damages statutes are needlessly narrow, allowing them in some very
specific situations while not allowing them in other very similar
circumstances. Such statutes should be broadened to protect similarly
situated plaintiffs and deter similarly situated defendants. At the very
least, any time a state legislature is considering creating a new statutory
tort, it should consider imposing multiple damages if the behavior being
targeted is intentional and deserving of deterrence.
APPENDIX: PROPOSED STATUTE

A court shall impose damages double the amount of compensatory
damages in any case of tortious conduct that was taken with the intent
to cause harm, with the knowledge that it would cause harm, or in
reckless disregard as to whether it would cause harm, unless special
circumstances would render the award unjust. In cases of malicious or
particularly egregious conduct, the court may award up to three times
the amount of compensatory damages. Tortious conduct includes any
actions that would subject a defendant to compensatory damages under
the common law of torts or for violation of any statute designed to
compensate persons harmed by the wrongful conduct of another, whether
such statute provides for multiple damages or not.

***

